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This research effort focused on the contracting history of the U. S. Marine Corps 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V) Program. The research answered the 
primary question of what were the critical contracting decisions that have been made 
during the program and how would an analysis of these contracting decisions affect the 
future of the AAA V program. Interviews were conducted with personnel from the 
AAA V program office and other Government agencies as well as with contractor 
employees. Additionally, program documents and other relevant literature were 
reviewed. The key findings of the research effort conclude that the unique collocation 
arrangement of the AAA V program office and the contractor should be emulated by other 
Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs); Integrated Product Teams (lPTs) and the 
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) concept is effective in improving 
communications between the Government and the contractor; and unique contract clauses 
used in the Concept Demonstration and Validation contract were effective in 
incentivizing the contractor. The unique contract clauses examined were: mandatory 
geographic location of the contractor's facility, collocation of the AAA V program office 
with the contractor, a Special Design Decision Provision, and contractor cost sharing. 
The research effort presents recommendations on how these aspects of the AAA V 
program can be applied to other MDAPs. 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) has been under close scrutiny by Congress 
over the past two decades because of its inability to field major defense acquisitions on 
time and at cost [Ref. 1 :p. 21]. Previous attempts by DoD to reform its acqusition process 
have met with only limited success. The latest attempt, initiated in 1994, attacks the 
procurement process by examining every step in the process and determining if there is a 
better way to do business. Some central themes to the current acquisition reform 
initiative include adopting commercial business practices, use of Integrated Product and 
Process Development (lPPD) and Integrated Product Teams (lPTs), Cost As an 
Independent Variable (CAIV), and use of Performance Specifications vice Military 
Design Specifications.[Ref. 2] 
In 1990, Congress passed the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(~AWIA) which mandated that DoD establish a professional acquisition workforce. 
Congress intended for this professional workforce to improve DoD's poor acquisition 
record by providing a core of experienced personnel to manage these complex programs 
[Ref. 3]. 
Program Managers (PM) for major defense acquisition programs face a daunting 
challenge to keep their program within stated cost, schedule, and performance 
parameters. They have many tools available to assist them in managing their programs 
but there is no substitute for experience. PMs must draw upon the experiences of others 
to avoid repeating another's mistakes. Lessons learned from a successful program should 
be published so that everyone within the acquistion community can see which initiatives 
were successful and which ones were not. This case history examines lessons learned 
from the AAA V program that can be applied to other major defense acquisition 
programs. 
In the early 1970s, the Marine Corps realized that it would eventually need to 
replace the Amphibiuous Assault Vehicle (AAV) in service at that time [Ref. 4]. The 
Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) concept was developed to meet the evolving 
doctrine of quickly inserting Marines ashore from ships over-the-horizon. After various 
alternatives were explored, it was determined that a vehicle would best meet the needs of 
the AAA concept.[Ref. 5:p. 2] 
The Marine Corps Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V) program was 
initiated, canceled and restarted three times during the 1970s to the mid 1980s [Ref. 4]. 
The AAA V program was final.ly approved and a Program Management Office (PMO) 
that focused solely on the AAA V was formed in 1990 [Ref. 6:p. 2]. Two contractors, 
General Dynamics and United Defense Limited Partnership (formerly known as the Food 
Machinery Corporation (FMC)), were used during the Concept Exploration phase to 
develop the best concept to meet the needs of the Marine Corps [Ref. 5:p. 2]. Following 
the Milestone I decision, General Dynamics was awarded a Cost-Plus-A ward-Fee 
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(CPAF) contract to develop the AAA V prototype during the Program DefinitionlRisk 
Reduction (PDRR) phase [Ref. 7]. During this phase, several unique requirements were 
placed on the contractor. First, the contractor was given a geographic region (Northern 
Virginia) in which to locate its facility. Second, the PMO was required to be collocated 
with the contractor. Finally, the contractor would use an Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD) program with Integrated Product Teams (IPTs) consisting of both 
contractor and Government employees.[Ref. 7] These requirements significantly changed 
the environment in which both the PMO and contractor worked. It also had a significant 
impact on the way day-to-day business was conducted.[Ref. 7] 
The collocation, IPTs and CP AF contract have provided many advantages during 
the PDRR phase of the AAAV program.[Ref. 7] There have also been many challenges 
to overcome since these management techniques had not been used in this fashion in a 
Major Defense Acquisition Pprogram before. Another issue that arose due to this unique 
arrangement is the use of the Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) to 
administer contracts. [Ref. 8] Issues regarding the need for DCMC to provide an 
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) given the collocation of the PMO and the 
contractor; and whether the PMO itself can administer the contract have yet to be 
answered. 
Despite the challenges faced during this era of acquistion reform, the AAA V 
PMO has flourished. It has been recognized as a model PMO and can certainly teach 
many valuable lessons that can be used by other PMOs. [Ref. 9] 
3 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to examine the contracting decisions made during 
the early phases of the Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAAV) program. The 
goal is to determine what impact these decisions had on the AAA V program at the time, 
the future implications of these decisions and to determine if these decisions can benefit 
other major defense acquisition programs. The research included conducting a thorough 
review of all available program documents, conducting interviews with present and 
former program management and contracting personnel, conducting interviews with 
representatives from the two contractors competing for the project, and conducting an 
analysis of these critical decisions. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: What have been the critical contracting 
decisions and events regarding the Advanced Assault Amphibian Vehicle (AAAV) 
program and how have these affected the nature and scope of the AAA V as it exists today 
and how will an analysis of these critical elements affect the development, production, 
and deployment of the AAAV? The subsidiary research questions are as follows: 
1. What was the Advanced Assault Amphibian (AAA) concept and how did it 
lead into the establishment of the Advanced Assault Amphibian Vehicle 
program? 
2. What was the initial acquisition strategy of the AAA V program and how has it 
evolved? 
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3. What was the organizational structure used to effectively execute the 
acquisition strategy of the AAAV program? 
4. What have been the contracting vehicles used during the AAAV program and 
h~w effective have they been? 
5. To what extent has the AAAV Project Management Office (PMO) used special 
contract clauses? 
6. What impact has the Integrated Product Team/Integrated Product and Process 
Development (lPTIIPPD) process had on the contracting effort within the 
AAA V program? 
7. How might an analysis of contracting decisions made in the early phases of the 
AAA V program be used in the successful execution of other defense 
acquisition programs? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this case study is limited to determining what contracting lessons 
can be learned from the AAAV PMO. The study will analyze the contracting decisions 
made within the PMO and determine whether or not they can be applied to other MDAPs. 
The study will also evaluate the contracting organization to determine whether or not it 
can be applied to other major systems acquisitions as well. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this research consisted of the following: (l) a literature 
search of books and magazine articles relating to amphibious operations and equipment, 
(2) a review of available AAAV program related material, and (3) personal and 
telephonic interviews with personnel assigned to the PMO, DCMC, Marine Corps 
Systems Command, and General Dynamics. 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
This thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter I presented the 
background and research questions for the study. Chapter II contains a historical 
perspective of amphibious assault vehicles from their introduction into the Marine Corps 
in the 1930s through the current AAA V program. Chapter III contains an explanation of 
the contracting history of the AAA V program, contracting organization, contract types 
and contract clauses, as well as the source selection process. Chapter IV examines the 
critical contracting decisions that have been made in the AAA V program. Finally, 
Chapter V contains the conclusions drawn from the research and recommendations for 




This chapter will cover the history of amphibious assault vehicles in the Marine 
Corps, the doctrinal changes that led to the establishment of the Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AAAV) program, and the establishment of the Direct Reporting 
Program Manager for Advanced Amphibious Assault (DRPM AAA) Program 
Management Office (PMO). The Marine Corps has been developing and refining 
amphibious doctrine since 1920, when the Commandant of the Marine Corps was told by 
the Chief of Naval Operations to develop a structure that would allow for the seizure of 
advanced naval bases.[Ref. lO:pp. 6-8] Amphibious doctrine continued to slowly evolve 
over the next 78 years. Amphibious assault vehicle capabilities improved as new 
technologies were identified. 
B. AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT 
The National Security Act of 1947 stated: [Ref. 11: p. 51] 
The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained and equipped to provide 
fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air 
components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of 
advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may 
be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. 
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Section 50 13 (b) of the Act states "The Marine Corps shall develop ... those phases 
of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, techniques, and equipment used by 
the landing force."[Ref. 6:p. 1] Therefore, by law, the Marine Corps is required to 
maintain the ability to conduct amphibious assault operations and to develop the 
equipment necessary to conduct such operations. 
An amphibious operation is an attack launched from the sea by naval and landing 
forces, embarked in ships or craft involving a landing on a hostile or potentially hostile 
shore. [Ref. 12] An amphibious assault is the principal type of amphibious operation, 
with the remaining types being a raid, a demonstration, and a withdrawal. Conducting 
amphibious operations is nothing new to the Marine Corps. On March 3, 1776, a short 
four months after the Marine Corps was established, Marines conducted their first 
amphibious operation - an amphibious raid on New Providence, Bahamas.[Ref. 13] This 
would be the first of countless successful amphibious operations conducted by the Marine 
Corps in its illustrious history. The Marine Corps' last major amphibious operation was 
the amphibious assault at Inchon, Korea in 1951 that turned the tide in the Korean 
War. [Ref. 13] 
C. AMPHIBIOUS DOCTRINE 
Although the Marine Corps has always maintained a maritime orientation, it 
expended little effort toward developing amphibious assault doctrine before the British 
disaster at Gallipoli in 1915 [Ref. 11 :p. 72]. Prior to this landing, the doctrine for 
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assaulting across a defended beach had not been developed. The difficulties encountered 
when assaulting across a defended or prepared beach are numerous, to include offshore 
mines, beach obstacles, prepared defensive positions, and emplaced defensive weapons. 
[Ref. 11 :p. 72] The disaster at Gallipoli and the Navy's involvement in War Plan 
ORANGE, a contingency plan developed in 1915 for war with the Japanese in the 
Pacific, provided some visionary Navy and Marine Corps officers the opportunity to 
focus on amphibious assault operations and develop the doctrine [Ref. 11 :p. 73]. By 
1920, the Navy recognized that in order to defeat Japan in the Pacific, they would need to 
capture Japanese-held islands and territories to establish advanced bases for coal and 
other logistic support purposes. Planning for such operations fell to the Marine Corps. 
[Ref. 11 :p. 74] 
One Marine officer who had been studying this possibility was Major Earl H. 
Ellis. Since 1912, Major Ellis had been convinced that the United States would 
eventually go to war with Japan, and that the United States would have to battle its way 
across the Pacific to defeat the Japanese.[Ref. 11 :p. 76] Major Ellis was also convinced 
that the United States would have to assault Japanese-held islands in the Pacific to 
establish the advanced naval bases needed to win the war. After extensive study, Major 
Ellis wrote a study entitled "Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia" in 1920-21 [Ref. 
11 :p. 77]. Uncanny in its accuracy, Major Ellis outlined in detail how he saw the 
western drive across the Pacific occurring. He predicted the need to establish advanced 
support bases in the Marshall and Caroline Islands to meet the needs of the naval fleet. 
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So thorough was his study, it was adopted by the Joint Board of the Army and Navy and 
called the "Orange Plan." [Ref. 11 :p. 77]. 
Many Marine Corps leaders agreed with Major Ellis' study. In preparation for 
executing the "Orange Plan," the Marine Corps held numerous training exercises 
throughout the 1920's designed to develop the skills necessary to conduct amphibious 
operations. Many worthwhile lessons learned were obtained from these early exercises, 
which later assisted in the initial development of amphibious doctrine. Training and 
equipment deficiencies were also identified during these early exercises. The need for 
specialized landing boats was seen as a critical equipment deficiency, a deficiency that 
would take over a decade to resolve. The training deficiencies could be corrected more 
quickly by developing amphibious doctrine [Ref. 11 :pp. 78-80]. 
An amphibious assault is one of the most complex military operational 
maneuvers. The noted British historian B. H. Liddell Hart stated that making such an 
assault is difficult, almost impossible.[Ref. 11 :p. 72] Because of the difficulties involved 
in conducting an amphibious assault, writing the doctrine would not be easy. The issues 
. that had to be addressed included: how to get equipment and weapons across any reefs 
and through the heavy surf; how to coordinate fire support from naval vessels and 
aircraft; how to coordinate the landing of assault forces across separate beaches; and how 
to combat load unit equipment and supplies. [Ref. 11 :pp. 72-79] Fortunately for the 
Marine Corps, there were officers willing to tackle this monumental effort. 
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In 1933, all Marine Corps officers, staff and student alike, at the Marine Corps 
Schools in Quantico, Virginia were directed to capture in writing everything that affected 
the landing force during an amphibious assault. All officers received a brief on the 
mistakes made by the British at Gallipoli, and were provided all available information on 
assault landing operations, which was limited. Using his own past experiences and 
reasoning, each officer then wrote what he thought were the proper sequence of events for 
conducting an amphibious assault. After seven months of dedicated effort, the Tentative 
Manual for Landing Operations, 1934, was published. This manual became known as 
LFM 0-1. [Ref. 14 :p. 34] Although it needed more work, LFM 0-1 captured the essence of 
the concepts related to amphibious assault and provided the framework for future 
refinement. Over the next several years, it was revised and updated. In 1938, the Navy 
adopted it as Fleet Training Publication No. 167, Landing Operations Doctrine, U.S. 
Navy. The Army published LFM 0-1 in 1941 as Field Manual 31-5. Little changed in 
either the manual itself or in Marine Corps doctrine over the next 50 years. [Ref. 11 :pp. 
79-82]. 
D. EARL Y AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT EQUIPMENT 
Now that doctrine was being developed, the Marine Corps turned its focus on 
procuring the equipment necessary to conduct an amphibious assault. The Marine Corps 
needed equipment that could transport Marines, and their heavy weapons and equipment, 
from Navy ships to the shore. As late as the winter maneuvers of 1936-1937, the Marine 
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Corps still had no practical way to rapidly build up combat power ashore. [Ref. 11: p. 90] 
By the time World War II broke out, two pieces of amphibious assault equipment had 
been fielded. One was the Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP), more 
commonly referred to as the Higgins Boat. The second was the Landing Vehicle, 
Tracked Model 1 (L VT 1) Amphibian Tractor, more commonly referred to as an 
amtrac. [Ref 15 :p. 69] 
1. The Higgins Boat 
The Higgins boat was named after its developer, Andrew Jackson Higgins. 
Higgins designed his boat, called the Eureka, in 1924 for use by rumrunners in the 
Mississippi Delta region. The design of the Eureka, a shallow draft thirty-six foot boat 
with a protected propeller, allowed the boat to conduct beach landings to offload its 
cargo, and then retract itself. [Ref. 11 :p. 92] 
Higgins had tried to interest the Navy in his boat, first in 1926 and every year 
thereafter, but to no avail [Ref. 11 :p. 92]. The Marine Corps became aware of Higgins' 
boat in 1934 and immediately recognized its utility in amphibious operations. After three 
years of Marine Corps pressure on the Navy's Bureau of Construction and Repair (later 
called the Bureau of Ships), the Navy finally procured one of Higgins' boats in 1937. 
Higgins' boat and several boats designed by the Bureau of Ships were tested during 
amphibious exercises in 1939 and 1940. At the end of the exercises, the Marine Corps 
determined that Higgins' boat best met their needs. [Ref. 11 :pp. 92-94] 
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The prospect of going to war with Japan continued to grow. Anticipating the 
upcoming conflict, in 1941 the Marine Corps asked Higgins to modify his Eureka boat to 
include a bow ramp for landing small vehicles [Ref. 11 :p. 94]. This was an idea 
borrowed from the Japanese. The Marine Corps also asked Higgins to design a landing 
craft that could carry an eighteen-ton tank [Ref. 11 :p. 94]. Working quickly, and at his 
own expense, Higgins modified two Eureka boats to include a bow ramp and converted 
an existing lighter into a landing craft, with bow ramp, capable of carrying an eighteen-
ton tank. After undergoing successful evaluation by a board from the Marine Corps and 
the Navy, the Navy ordered two hundred of Higgins' boats. The tank-carrying landing 
craft designed by Higgins had a much slower route to acceptance. After a year of tests, 
the Higgins-designed tank landing craft won the competition and all subsequent tank 
carriers were constructed using Higgins' design. [Ref. 11 :p. 98] At last, the Marine Corps 
had a suitable landing craft for conducting amphibious assaults. 
2. The Amtrac 
The Higgins boat went a long way toward meeting the Marine Corps' equipment 
needs for conducting amphibious assaults in the Pacific. However, it fell short in two 
critical areas. [Ref. 11 :p. 100] First, the Higgins boat could not cross the coral reefs that 
surrounded many of the islands the Marines needed to capture. Oftentimes, the water 
over the coral reef was too shallow for the Higgins boat to safely cross. Additionally, the 
water around the reef was very choppy due to the surf breaking over the coral. Secondly, 
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the Higgins boat did not provide the Marines with the capability to quickly push supplies 
and equipment off of the beach, where it was vulnerable to enemy fire. This limitation 
proved disastrous for the British at Gallipoli, and the Marine Corps did not want to repeat 
this mistake.[Ref. 11 :p. 100] 
The Marine Corps saw a potential solution to these problems after an article 
appeared in the October 4, 1937 issue of Life magazine [Ref. lO:p. 32]. The article 
described a vehicle that was designed to operate in the water and on the land, and was 
capable of travelling over coral and through mud and shoal water. The vehicle, designed 
and built by Donald Roebling, was developed as a rescue vehicle for people lost in the 
Everglades or stranded by tropical storms. John Roebling, a wealthy industrialist, saw 
the need for such a vehicle after a devastating hurricane struck Florida in 1928, killing 
scores of people because no rescue vehicle existed that could navigate the Everglades or 
deliver needed supplies. [Ref. 11 :p. 100] John Roebling directed his son, Donald, to 
design a vehicle that "would bridge the gap between where a boat grounded and a car 
flooded out." [Ref. 16:p. 54] In addition to meeting the needs of people living in the 
Everglades, John Roebling also saw the commercial potential for such a rescue vehicle 
outside the Everglades. [Ref. 10:p. 24] 
In 1933, Donald Roebling began designing his water rescue vehicle, which he first 
tested in 1935. The vehicle, known as the "Alligator," could achieve 2.3 miles per hour 
on the water and 25 miles per hour on the land.[Ref. 10:p. 26] For the next two years, 
Donald Roebling worked to correct its many deficiencies. During this time, Roebling 
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improved the Alligator's water and land speed, reduced its weight, enhanced its 
maneuverability, and increased the reliability of the track system. By 1937, Donald 
Roebling had built the versatile rescue vehicle that his father envisioned.[Ref. lO:pp. 24-
33] 
The Marine Corps began evaluating the Alligator in 1938 and soon became 
convinced that it could provide the combat assault capability required in the Pacific to 
secure advanced naval bases. The Marine Corps knew it had to act fast, as signs of war 
with Japan were growing. [Ref. 11 :p. 102] After conducting a series of exercises over the 
next two years, Marine Corps representatives met with Bureau of Ships representatives 
and Donald Roebling to discuss the Alligator's deficiencies and to develop a production 
model for the new Alligator. This new vehicle became known as the Landing Vehicle, 
Tracked Modell (LVT-l).[Ref. 15:p. 69] The LVT-l could achieve 7 miles per hour on 
the water and 18 miles per hour on the land, and had a cargo carrying capacity of 4000 
pounds. In August 1941, just six months after the production decision was made, the 
Marine Corps accepted delivery of its first L VT -1. [Ref. 10:p. 46] 
The L VT -1 saw its first combat action in the assault on Guadalcanal in August 
1942, serving primarily as a logistics vehicle transporting supplies from Navy ships to 
supply dumps ashore [Ref. 11 :p. 105]. The L VT continued its primary role as a logistics 
vehicle in subsequent amphibious assaults until November 1943, the landing at Tarawa 
[Ref. 15:p. 69]. For the first time, LVTs were used to transport Marines on the initial 
assault. Although nearly half of the L VTs were disabled by enemy fire during the 
15 
assault, the L VT proved to be effective in transporting the assault force.[Ref. 11 :pp. 105-
108] The L VT now had a second mission - serving as an armored personnel carrier 
during the amphibious assault. However, the amtrac was not formally designated an 
assault amphibian until 1977, 34 years after proving its worth on the bloody beaches at 
Tarawa. [Ref. 15 :p. 70] 
The LVT continued to be improved and modified during World War II. One 
significant improvement was the addition of a stern ramp. [Ref. 15 :p. 70] Stern ramps 
eased cargo handling, permitted the landing of small vehicles and weapons, and allowed 
assault forces to storm the beach straight from the L VT without having to climb over the 
vehicle's sides. By the end of the war, four cargo variants and two assault gun variants 
had been produced. All together, 18,816 LVTs were produced during World War II. 
[Ref. 15:p. 71] 
As a testimony to the significant role the L VT played during the war, the 
Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Corps, MajGen Roy S. Geiger, wrote: 
Except for the "amtracs" it would have been impossible to get ashore on 
Tarawa, Saipan, Guam or Peleliu without taking severe if not prohibitive 
losses. But, their use is by no means limited to the assault waves; after 
landing troops and equipment, they play an indispensable part in the 
movement of supplies, ammunition, et cetera, ashore. In fact, the whole 
ship-to-shore movement in the normal amphibious operation is to a 
considerable extent dependent on one or more of the "amtrac" family. 
[Ref. 15:pp. 73-74] 
By the end of World War II, the amtrac had earned its place in Marine Corps amphibious 
assault operations. 
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3. Fielding the L VT(P)5 
The amtrac once again proved itself during the 1 st Marine Division's assault on 
Inchon and the subsequent liberation of Seoul during the Korean War [Ref. 15:p. 74]. 
Throughout the war, amtracs served as armored personnel carriers, logistics vehicles, and 
self-propelled artillery. 
In 1953, the Marine Corps fielded the L VT(P)5 as the replacement for the 
L VT(3 )C. This was the first new version of the L VT since World War II. The L VT(P)5 
provided increased performance and more importantly, included several variants. These 
variants consisted of recovery, command, engineer support, and fire support (105mm 
howitzer mounted in the turret) vehicles. [Ref. 15:p. 74] 
The LVT(P)5 saw considerable action during both the Korean War and the 
Vietnam War, where it participated in most of the 62 landings made by Marines. During 
the Vietnam War, the amtracs showed their versatility once again by also serving as 
armored personnel carriers, logistics vehicles moving supplies across inland waterways, 
patrol vehicles both ashore and afloat, and even serving in an infantry role near the 
Demilitarized Zone. [Ref. 15:p. 75] 
4. Fielding the L VTP7 
After nearly 20 years of service, the L VT(P)5 was finally replaced. In 1972, the 
Marine Corps began fielding the cargo version of the L VTP7 and shortly thereafter, a 
recovery and a command variant. Fielding was completed in 1974. No successor to the 
17 
L VT(P)5 engineer support and fire support variants were produced. The L VTP7, the 
first water-jet propelled amphibian vehicle, provided the Marine Corps with an 
amphibious vehicle capable of reaching a water speed of six knots. The drawbacks to the 
LVTP7 included a reduced troop-carrying and cargo-carrying capacity, which was now 
limited to 25 troops or 10,000 pounds of cargo. [Ref. 15:p. 75] 
In 1977, the L VT was renamed the Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AA V) in 
recognition of its mission change. The role of the AA V changed from combat service 
support to combat support. In addition to its role in amphibious assaults, the AA V would 
be used more extensively in a mechanized role during operations ashore. This would 
allow combat forces to take advantage of the AAV's mobility, protection from small arms 
fire, and protection in a Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) environment. [Ref. 
17:pp.2-3] 
The planned service life of the L VTP7 was ten years. Since no replacement was 
ready, a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) was begun in 1982 to extend the 
vehicle's service life to 1994. A Product Improvement Program (PIP) was initiated in 
1985 to extend the life of the L VPT7 to the year 2004. The PIP included an automatic 
fire suppression system, a bow plane, an armor upgrade, and an Upgunned Weapon 
Station (featuring a 40mm Mk19 Mod 3 machinegun, an M2HB .50-caliber machinegun, 
and an M257 smoke grenade launcher). In conjunction with the SLEP, the LVTP7 was 
redesignated the L VTP7 AI. 
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5. The Landing Vehicle Assault Program 
The Marine Corps initiated a feasibility study in 1971 to develop a replacement 
for the L VTP7. In 1973 a Tentative Operational Requirement was established that 
identified the need for a high-speed (70 mph on water/55 mph on land) amphibious 
vehicle with an Initial Operational Capability (lOC) of 1986. This program became 
known as the Landing Vehicle Assault (LV A) program. After reviewing several 
alternatives to the high-speed amphibian program, the Marine Corps issued an 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) in 1974 that identified the LV A as its highest 
priority.. The Major System Acquisition Review Committee (MSARC) approved the 
LV A in 1975 and Feasibility/Concept contracts were awarded shortly thereafter. The 
contracts were awarded to FMC Corp., Bell Aerospace Textron, and Pacific Car and 
Foundry. Work continued on the LV A for the next several years, with Conceptual 
Design contracts being awarded in 1976 to the same three companies and the continued 
development of components for high-speed amphibians. [Ref. 18] 
In 1978, the Department of Defense (DoD) approved the Marine Corps' 
Amphibious Warfare Surface Assault (A WSA) Mission Element Need Statement 
(MENS) for the LV A. As directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and 
Engineering, the Marine Corps conducted a Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis 
(COEA) on four alternatives identified in the A WSA MENS. They were the LVA (high 
water speed amphibian), the Landing Vehicle Tracked (Experimental) (LVT (X)) (low 
water speed amphibian), an Infantry Fighting Vehicle (lFV) (brought ashore on high-
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speed landing craft), and an all helicopter-borne assault force. After reviewing the results 
of the concept studies for the L V A in 1979, the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) 
cancelled the L V A program, citing concerns about vulnerability, affordability, and 
maintainability. With the concurrence of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the CMC 
also cancelled the requirement for an Over-The-Horizon amphibious capability, stating 
that amphibious assaults can be launched under ten miles from shore. The L VT (X) was 
then chosen as the replacement for the LV A program. [Ref. 18] 
6. The Landing Vehicle Tracked (Experimental) Program 
The Landing Vehicle Tracked (Experimental) (LVT (X)) program had an IOC of 
1986, so Conceptual Design contracts were awarded in 1978 to Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 
FMC Corp., Bell Aerospace Textron, and Advanced Technology, Inc .. [Ref. 17:p. 3]. In 
December 1979, the CMC approved an interim Acquisition Strategy for the LVT (X) 
program, establishing an IOC of 1990. An approved Acquisition Strategy was not signed 
until 1983. In April 1982, the IOC was changed to 1994 in order to avoid any overlap 
with the LVTP7Al SLEP. The IOC was changed again in 1983 to reflect a new IOC of 
1997. In a span of four years, the IOC for the L VT (X) had slipped 11 years. [Ref. 18] 
The MSARC Milestone I review, held over three sessions in 1984, was the 
turning point in the L VT (X) program. During the first session, three critical questions 
concerning the validity of the LVT eX) requirements were raised: [Ref. I7:p. 8] 
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1. In light of the development of new systems, such as the Light Armored 
Vehicle (LAV) and the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), did the 
Marine Corps still need an Amphibious Warfare Surface Assault (A WSA) 
capability? 
2. If the Marine Corps still needed an AWSA capability, was the LVT (X) 
Required Operational Capability (ROC) still valid? 
3. Did the Concept Design/Sustaining Engineering contractor design 
adequately fulfill the requirement? 
After receiving answers to these questions, the MSARC recommended in October 1984 
that the L VT (X) program strategy be approved, and Demonstration and Validation 
(D&V) contracts awarded. The CMC gave his approval in November 1984. [Ref. 17:pp. 
8-30] 
Despite receiving approval to enter the D& V phase, concerns about L VT (X) 
requirements persisted. In response to questions posed by the Secretary of the Navy 
(Research, Engineering, and Systems) in 1984 concerning the validity of the L VT (X) 
requirements, the CMC provided the following program alternatives and 
recommendations: [Ref. 18] 
1. Continue L VT (X) program with IOC of 1998 (recommend disapproval). 
2. Field only the L VT (X)P (troop-carrying variant) with an IOC of 1995 
(recommend disapproval). 
3. Institute the Advanced Assault Amphibian (AAAV) program (recommend 
approval). 
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After further review, the Secretary of the Navy (SecNav) cancelled the LVT(X) 
program in 1985. The SecNav determined that the marginal improvements in firepower 
and armor in the L VT (X) compared with the L VTP7 A 1 was not worth the estimated $9 
billion cost of the new program. A ROC for the L VTP7 A 1 PIP was approved. More 
importantly, the AAAV program was designated as the new replacement vehicle for the 
L VTP7 A 1. [Ref. 18] 
E. MODERN ERA OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS 
During the mid-1970's, the Navy's primary role was sea control and convoy escort 
for the reinforcement role of Europe [Ref. 19:p. 23]. The Navy was a "blue-water" navy, 
focused primarily on countering the Soviet threat. Little emphasis was placed on the 
littorals and a surface-borne amphibious assault was seen as folly given the lethality of 
the weapons available at that time. In fact, during the late 1970's to the early 1980's 
initiatives were begun to "heavy-up" the Marine Corps to mirror existing Army divisions 
and move the Marine Corps away from its traditional amphibious role. Many believed a 
duplication of Army roles would lead to the future demise of the Marine Corps. 
The Iranian hostage crisis in 1979 revealed significant weaknesses in the current 
doctrine with regard to the United States' ability to handle small-scale contingencies. As 
a result, the Carter Doctrine was developed in January of 1980 as a way to resolve the 
problems in the Arabian Gulf region. This was the first step in the path that led to the 
revalidation of a global military strategy for the United States. At that time, carrier battle 
22 
groups and amphibious ready groups were the only military assets capable of establishing 
U.S. presence in the Arabian Gulf region.[Ref. 19:pp. 23-24] The Department of the 
Navy's response to the changing world environment was to publish "The Maritime 
Strategy" in 1983. "The Maritime Strategy" addressed the role of Naval Forces in the 
execution of the National Military Strategy.[Ref. 19:p. 24] 
1. Doctrine for Amphibious Operations Changes 
In June 1985, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the 
Marine Corps (CMC) published the "Amphibious Warfare Strategy" as a subset to "The 
Maritime Strategy". This new strategy outlined the employment of Navy-Marine Corps 
amphibious forces in support of the United States global national military strategy.[Ref. 
19:pp. 24-25] The "Amphibious Warfare Strategy" stated that amphibious forces could 
be stationed Over-The-Horizon (OTH) at sea. [Ref. 19:p. 25] OTH meant launching the 
amphibious assault from 20 - 25 miles from the beach, as opposed to the previous 
doctrine of no more than 2.5 miles. This doctrinal change reflected the lethality that 
modern weapons would have on ships forced in close to shore to debark slow-moving 
assault landing craft. 
This new strategy identified two new and then unfielded pieces of equipment, the 
Landing Craft, Air Cushion (LCAC) and the MV-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, as the new 
equipment that would be used to conduct these OTH operations. The LCAC and MV -22 
were crucial because their high speed and long range provided the ability to operate from 
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OTH while still allowing for a more rapid closure to the beach.[Ref. 19:p. 28] Not 
surprisingly, there was no mention in this new strategy of the AAV, an improved AAV, 
or the AAAV. (It is interesting to note that when the "Amphibious Warfare Strategy" 
was published, the LCAC had not yet been fielded and its shortcomings - inability to 
conduct an amphibious assault across a defended beach due to its susceptibility to even 
small arms fire - had not been fully identified.) Finally, the "Amphibious Warfare 
Strategy" did recognize that doctrinal changes were required in order to fully implement 
the new over the horizon strategy: "The formation of an operational and tactical 
framework for amphibious operations from over the horizon is a high priority project." 
The best and the brightest officers in the Marine Corps were identified as working on the 
project.[Ref. 19:p. 28] 
2. Equipment Changes Supporting the Over-The-Horizon Doctrine 
During the mid-1980's the Marine Corps recognized that its aging equipment did 
not support the new OTH doctrine being developed. The AA V was too slow and had 
limited firepower and protection. The CH-46 Sea Knight helicopter had been fielded in 
the 1960's and was reaching the end of its service life. So, the Marine Corps began a 
modernization program that allowed Marine Air Ground Task Forces to become more 
lethal and mobile while still maintaining their amphibious character. [Ref. 19:p 20] The 
MV -22 was being developed as a replacement for the CH-46 while the AA V underwent a 
Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) to improve its mobility. At this same time, 
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fielding of the LCAC had begun and was revolutionizing ship-to-shore movement. 
Because of its high speed and payload capacity, the new LCAC caused many to question 
the need for a replacement amphibious vehicle. 
The L VT (X) program was cancelled in June 1985 as a follow on to the existing 
AA V family. The lack of a credible amphibious assault vehicle that could replace the 
existing AA V and offer substantial improvement in performance, namely in higher water 
speed, provided an additional reason for LCAC supporters to question the Marine Corps' 
existing amphibious doctrine. Many felt that the "traditional concepts of an amphibious 
assault (were) obsolete" because of the "vulnerability of ships and slow moving landing 
craft to modern weapons systems."[Ref. 20:p. 80] The solution lay in a high-speed 
method of moving Marines from ship-to-shore. The cancellation of the L VT(X) program 
provided the impetus for many to express their ideas in professional journals on how to 
best accomplish this high-speed operation. 
One idea, based on the capabilities of the LCAC, called for the "adoption of a 
smaller Air Cushion Vehicle (ACV) designed primarily to carry the AA V from ship-to-
shore."[Ref. 20:pp. 22-23] The. author felt that while AA Vs were still intended to carry 
assault elements to the beach, they were too slow and too dependent on beach (tide and 
surf) conditions. Furthermore, the use of AA V s in conjunction with the LCAC would 
limit the future capability of the LCAC due to the AAVs slow speed. By using a new 
ACV to carry the AAV, the differences in speed would be overcome and would allow 
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them to work better together. At that time, the LCAC was slated to replace all other 
landing craft (LCM-8 and LCU) by mid 1990. 
Another concept that was discussed was creating a new Landing Ship Fast (LSF) 
that would be designed to carry AA V s along with 150-200 Marines and their organic 
weapons [Ref. 22:p. 19]. The LSF would be capable of speeds up to 75 knots in order to 
make a high-speed approach to the beach to allow the AA V s to debark close to the shore. 
The LSF was to be based on technology being developed at the time for an inter-island 
vehicle and passenger ferry for use between the Hawaiian Islands. 
Other articles called for using the LCAC to carry the existing AA V from ship-to-
shore. However, this idea had its drawbacks as the LCAC only had the deck space to 
carry three AAVs at a time. Unfortunately, the payload capacity of the LCAC required 
that the AA V s not be fully fueled or manned with infantry Marines in order to conserve 
weight. This plan was not viable because the LCACs could not bring artillery and 
ammunition to shore immediately behind the assault Marines in order to quickly build up 
combat power ashore. Others even suggested that up to 250 Marines could be brought 
ashore in a single LCAC but recognized the difficulties in an amphibious assault without 
any armor protection. 
Each of these ideas was studied but results were always the same: the Marine 
Corps needed a high-water speed assault vehicle capable of 20+ knots that could bring 
Marines quickly ashore. The new vehicle would also need to have improved cross-
country mobility and the ability to keep up with the modem main battle tank, MIAl. 
26 
3. Beginnings of Advanced Amphibious Assault 
The many problems associated with the L VT (X) program served as an invaluable 
source of lessons learned for other Marine Corps acquisition programs. One such 
problem area was program management. Initially, overall program management was the 
responsibility of the Naval Sea Systems Command (NA VSEA), who was designated as 
the Principal Decision Authority (PDA). This responsibility was a carryover from a 
charter signed between the Marine Corps and the Navy during the LVA program. The 
Commanding General, Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) 
was responsible for developing the program. As a result of this divided responsibility, 
the L VT (X) Program Manager (PM) was assigned to NA VSEA but had two reporting 
chains. The PM reported to a Project Manager at NAVSEA and to the Director, 
Development Center at MCDEC. To make matters worse, no program charter had been 
developed. Clearly, this was not a good arrangement. Program oversight was difficult to 
maintain due to the number of military activities (12) and contractors (5) that program 
issues needed to be staffed through and coordinated. In an attempt to ease some of the 
program oversight problems, a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between MCDEC and 
NA VSEA was drafted in 1980 but never signed. The MOA established clear lines of 
authority and responsibility for the L VT (X) program. [Ref. 17 :pp.l 0-11] 
In June 1985, as the LVT (X) program was transitioning from the Concept 
Exploration phase to the D& V phase, the Marine Corps decided to take a more active role 
in managing the program. They established a Marine Corps AA V program office at 
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NA VSEA (PMS 310) and assigned a Marine Corps program manager, known as the 
Program Manager, Marine Corps Assault Amphibious Vehicles (PM-MCAAV), and a 
staff to manage AAV issues.[Ref. 17:p. 12] 
When the L VT (X) program was cancelled in June 1985, the Marine Corps stated 
it still needed a replacement amphibious vehicle and assigned program management 
responsibility to PMS 310. The new vehicle was designated as the Advanced 
Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V) but the program was not scheduled to begin until 
Fiscal Year 1991.[Ref. 23:p. 8] 
Over the next two years PMS 310 fulfilled their tasking of further technological 
development in the area of high water speed for the AAA V. In 1986, as a result of 
taskings from PMS 310, the David Taylor Naval Research Center produced an 
Automotive Test Rig (ATR) and a 12 scale manned high water speed demonstrator. In 
1987, a contract was awarded for a High Water Speed Technology Demonstrator 
(HWSTD) to AAI Corporation. 
In December 1987 a Mission Area Analysis (MAA) was completed on ship-to-
shore movement that identified significant operational deficiencies with the existing 
AA V7 A 1. These deficiencies covered the entire spectrum of capabilities necessary for an 
amphibious assault vehicle: offensive and defensive firepower, water speed, land speed, 
agility and mobility, armor protection and overall system survivability. [Ref. 24:p. 2] 
These deficiencies were identified by the Marine Corps in a Mission Need Statement 
(MNS) titled "Advanced Amphibious Assault" for a replacement to the AA V7 Al as part 
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of its 1990 - 1991 Program Objective Memorandum (POM) submission in 1988.[Ref. 
24:p. 2] These deficiencies resulted in the Deputy Secretary of Defense signing a 
Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) on 14 July 1988 approving the Advanced 
Amphibious Assault (AAA) as a major new ACAT 1 (D) program. The Acquisition 
Decision Memorandum (ADM) was signed by the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition (USD (A)) on 19 August 1988. This signified the beginning of Phase 0 
(Concept Exploration) of the program. 
The MNS submitted by the Marine Corps offered three alternatives as 
replacements for the existing AA V7 A 1. The three alternatives were: a new high water 
speed amphibian, a new low water speed amphibian ferried ashore by a high-speed craft 
or sled, or an improved AAV7Pl (dubbed AAV7P2) ferried ashore by a high speed craft 
or sled.[Ref. 18:p.l1] After reviewing these alternatives, the Defense Acquisition Board 
modified the MNS by tasking the Marine Corps to develop additional alternatives. 
4. Establishment of the Program Management Office 
In March 1990, the resources of PMS 310 were consolidated and moved from 
NA VSEA to the Marine Corps Research, Development, and Acquisition Command 
(MCRDAC) (CBA V). The PM-MCAA V was redesignated the Direct Reporting Program 
Manager for Advanced Amphibious Assault (DRPM AAA). The new reporting chain 
was much more streamlined than before. The DRPM AAA now reported directly to the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)), 
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who is the Navy Acquisition Executive (NAE). The DRPM AAA Charter was signed by 
ASN (RD&A) in August I990.[Ref. 6:pp. 1-4] 
The Charter assigned the DRPM AAA responsibility for all current and future 
AA V programs, to include advanced development, production, modernization, 
conversion, and life cycle technical support. The DRPM AAA was tasked with 
developing a program: 
intended to design, develop, and field a cost-effective, state of the art 
system of AAA V's to replace the existing AA V7 A 1 series of amphibians. 
The AAA V will be a high water speed amphibian vehicle capable of 
independent operations in water and on land. It will provide one of the 
principal means of tactical surface mobility, armored protection, and 
offensive firepower for the landing force during both the ship-to-shore 
phase of amphibious operations and subsequent combat operations ashore. 
[Ref. 24] 
Additionally, the charter mandated that the DRPM, AAA be collocated with 
MCRDAC "to ensure an optimum working relationship [Ref. 6:p. 5]." The charter also 
identified AAA as the Marine Corps number one ground priority. At the time the Charter 
was signed, the AAA program consisted of the following five Program Elements [Ref. 6]: 
1. Assault Amphibious Vehicles (AAV7 Al family) 
2. AA V Product Improvements (AA V7 A 1 PIP) 
3. Advanced Amphibious Assault (AAA) 
4. Stratified Charged Rotary Engine (SCRE) 
5. Marine Corps Assault Vehicles (Engineering) 
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The DRPM AAA remained responsible for all AA V programs until June 1993, 
when the AAA V and AA V programs were functionally separated. The AA V and related 
programs were transferred from DRPM AAA to the Commander, Marine Corps Systems 
Command (COMMARCORSYSCOM).[Ref. 25] COMMARCORSYSCOM was now 
responsible for maintaining the AA V until the AAA V was fielded. DRPM AAA could 
now focus all of his energies on successfully fielding the AAAV. 
5. Amphibious Doctrine in the 1990's 
In September 1992, the Department of the Navy published its White Paper 
" ... From the Sea: A New Direction for the Naval Services" outlining a new vision for the 
Navy and Marine Corps.[Ref. 26:p. 19] " ... From the Sea" defined the Navy's new 
strategy as one that has shifted "from a focus on global threat to a focus on regional 
challenges and opportunities." This strategic direction, derived from the National 
Security Strategy, represents a fundamental shift away from open ocean warfighting on 
the sea toward joint operations conducted from the sea.[Ref. 26:p.19] This strategic 
concept was designed to carry the Navy beyond the Cold War and into the 21 st Century 
[Ref. 27:p. 32]. One of the fundamental tenants of " ... From the Sea" involves power 
projection. Naval forces maneuver from the sea using their dominance of littoral areas to 
mass forces rapidly and generate high-intensity, precise offensive power at the time and 
location of their choosing, under any weather conditions, day or night.(Ref. 26:p.21] The 
final statement of " ... From the Sea" is that the Navy and Marine Corps will "procure 
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equipment systems to support this strategy and remain ahead of the global technological 
revolution in military systems."[Ref. 26:p. 22] The implication for the Marine Corps is 
that this new strategy wholeheartedly supports the procurement of the AAA V and the 
MV-22. 
Two years later, in October of 1994, " ... From the Sea" was updated with 
"Forward ... From the Sea". While it did not signal any doctrinal changes, this latest 
White Paper reaffirmed the Navy's commitment to operations in the littorals. Though 
not explicitly stated, both white papers outline a strategy that is dependent on the 
capabilities that will be provided by the AAA V. Without a high water speed amphibious 
assault vehicle, the Navy and Marine Corps will be limited in their ability to project 
power ashore quickly. 
The strategy that does explicitly mention the AAA V is "Operational Maneuver 
From The Sea (OMFTS)" which was published in January 1996. OMFTS builds on 
" ... From the Sea" and "Forward ... From the Sea" and describes how the Navy and Marine 
Corps will combine naval and maneuver warfare and to achieve decisive objectives 
through ship-to-objective maneuver (STOM). OMFTS is dependent on the ability of the 
Navy and Marine Corps to "sea-base" its command and control, logistics and the majority 
of fire support assets. Sea-basing will facilitate "putting the "teeth" ashore while leaving 
the logistics "tail" afloat, significantly leveraging land maneuver operations."[Ref. 28] In 
order to accomplish OMFTS, the Marine Corps will need assets that are able to leave the 
"sea-base", most likely loitering over-the-horizon, and reach the beach quickly. OMFTS 
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identifies three key platforms that are required to bring the concept to reality: the MV-22 
Osprey, the LCAC, and the AAA V." [Ref. 28] 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter has outlined the history of the doctrine and equipment the Marine 
Corps has used in executing amphibious operations. Beginning in the 1930's with a 
rough concept on how to conduct amphibious assaults and the Higgins Boat, the Marine 
Corps developed doctrine and the venerable "amtrac" that ensured the success in the 
Pacific Island hopping campaign of World War II. Since then, the Marine Corps has 
continually honed and developed both the doctrine and the equipment itself. The Marine 
Corps continued developing the doctrine and trying to improve on the equipment, even 
when many felt that the idea of conducting an amphibious assault was insane, given the 
lethality of modem weapons and the slow water speed of the amtrac. Now, the Marine 
Corps has entered into the latest era of amphibious operations. This era will be marked 
by over-the-horizon operations conducted by the most technologically advanced assault 
. amphibian the Marine Corps has ever seen: the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle. 
The next chapter will present the contracting history of the AAA V program, the 
contracting organizations that support it, the contract types used and the unique contract 
clauses used during the Concept Demonstration and Validation phase. 
33 
34 
III. CONTRACTING PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The success of any Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) is a result of 
many factors: politics, organizations, people, and processes. The contracting process is 
one vehicle that ties all of the factors together. Politicians may cancel a MDAP 
developing a necessary weapon system due to a controversy such as a cost overrun. 
Organizational priorities change and may cause a MDAP to be cancelled or significantly 
changed. [Ref. 1 :p. 15] Inexperienced people in the Program Management Office (PMO) 
may make mistakes that jeopardize a program. Finally, the acquisition process itself, 
with its oversight and reviews, can cause a much-needed system to be canceled or the 
program delayed. 
The contract is the link between the Government and the contractor and the means 
by which the system requirements are expressed. Without a clearly defined, well-written 
and adequately managed contract, the PMO can experience difficulties and problems that 
can significantly jeopardize the success of the program. This chapter examines the 
contracting history and the contracting process itself as it has been used within the 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAA V) program. It will also examine the 
organizations that have played a role in the AAAV program. Next, this chapter addresses 
the contract types available for use and actually used at the AAAV program. Finally, the 
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chapter describes the unique contract clauses that have been used in the AAA V Concept 
DemonstrationlValidation (CDN) contract. The Concept DemonstrationlValidation 
phase is now known as the Program Definition and Risk Reduction (PDRR) but will be 
referred to hereafter as the CDN phase. 
B. CONTRACTING HISTORY 
The current AAA V program formally began with the approval of Milestone 0 in 
the Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) published in July 1988. The Acquisition 
Decision Memorandum (ADM) published the following month directed the Marine Corps 
to "examine alternatives of placing infantry ashore, not just a new amphibious vehicle." 
The program was given the official name Program Manager, Advanced Amphibious 
Assault (PM, AAA). This name was intended to reflect the program's pursuit for a 
solution to the ship-to-shore portion of the new over-the-horizon (OTH) doctrinal concept 
from a number of proposed ideas, not a solution limited only to an amphibious vehicle. 
1. Technology Base Development Program 
Numerous efforts had been undertaken before Milestone 0 approval to help 
develop the technology necessary to design and build the new high-water speed 
amphibious assault vehicle. In 1985, a Technology Base Development Program was 
initiated by the Amphibious Warfare Technology Directorate (A WT) at the Marine Corps 
Research, Development and Acquisition Command (MCRDAC).[Ref. 5] The Marine 
Corps Programs office at the David Taylor Research Center (DTRC) located in Bethesda, 
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Maryland executed the research and development effort. The technology development 
was intended to help show that the high-water speed amphibian was possible while at the 
same targeting the high "drivers" of affordability, risk and performance.[Ref. 29] 
a. Automotive Test Rig 
The Automotive Test Rig (ATR) was the first step in the DTRC's quest to 
prove that a high-water speed amphibian was possible. But this was not DTRC's first 
exposure to a high-water speed assault amphibian. They had worked on the L V A 
program in the 1970s and had developed an idea of what the future AAA V would look 
like. So they began by "reverse engineering" the AAA V and began projects that reduced 
the vehicle weight; developed a retractable hydropneumatic suspension; and the first 
"drive-by-wire" system for a combat vehicle. [Ref. 30] 
A Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract was competitively awarded to 
AAI Corporation to produce the ATR [Ref. 30]. The ATR was a 'li scale, 14 ton, manned 
vehicle that was used to prove the feasibility of the automotive components needed by the 
AAAV before they were included into the next phase of the Technology Base 
Development Program.[Ref. 31:p. 37] 
h. High Water Speed Technology Demonstrator 
The AAI Corporation was competitively awarded the follow-on contract 
by DTRC to produce the High-Water Speed Technology Demonstrator (HWSTD) in 
1987. [Ref. 30] Again, a CPFF contract was used for this phase of the technology base 
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development program. [Ref. 30] The HWSTD was the next logical step up from the ATR. 
Weighing in at 16 tons, the HWSTD was .75 scale and incorporated many of the 
improved components and subsystems of the ATR.[Ref. 5:p. 2] The HWSTD also 
introduced a bowflap, track covers and a transom flap with integrated water jets 
developed in-house by DTRC.[Ref. 31 :p. 37] The HWSTD was tested extensively from 
December 1989 through the first quarter of 1990 at the David Taylor Surface Effects Ship 
Support Office (SESSO) at Patuxent, Maryland. During testing the HWSTD achieved 
water speeds of33 miles per hour.[Ref. 18] 
c. Propulsion System Demonstrator 
The Propulsion System Demonstrator (PSD), a .9 scale, 30 ton armored 
amphibious vehicle, was the final step in the technology base development program by 
DTRC. The contract for the PSD was a competitively awarded CPFF contract that again 
went to the AAI Corporation.[Ref. 30] The objective of the PSD was to "demonstrate the 
feasibility of attaining 20 plus miles per hour over water speed in a full scale troop 
carrying vehicle."[Ref. 32] While the ATR and the HWSTD demonstrated automotive 
and waterborne capabilities, they were not capable of carrying personnel, other than the 
driver and an evaluator. Nor were they armored. The PSD, on the other hand, carried a 
crew of three along with sixteen troops. [Ref. 32] 
The PSD was tested at DTRC's SESSO on the Patuxent River in the Fall 
of 1991 through March 1992 where it achieved a top water speed of28.7 knots.[Ref. 5:p. 
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2] During the testing period a demonstration of the PSD was also held on the Potomac 
River, near the Washington Monument, on February 12, 1992. In attendance at this 
demonstration were numerous influential people from the office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Acquisition) (USD(A)) as well as the Department of the Navy. Attendees 
included the Head of the Conventional Systems Committee (USD(A)), Mr. Kendall; the 
Director of Land Warfare (USD(A)), Mr. Viilu; the Director of Naval Warfare (USD(A)), 
Mr. Martin; the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research Development and 
Acquisition (ASN(RDA)), Mr. Cann; the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General 
Mundy; and several other General Officers. During two demonstrations held on that day, 
the PSD successfully demonstrated its maneuverability and high speed capabilities before 
demonstrating its ability to reconfigure itself from a sea-mode to land-mode. Following 
the high-water speed demonstration on the Potomac, it drove up the ramp at the Bolling 
Air Force Base yacht basin where the observers got a first-hand look at the PSD.[Ref. 33] 
This successful demonstration helped prove that the concept of a high-water speed assault ' 
amphibian was indeed possible. 
2. Concept Exploration Contracts 
The Concept Exploration (CE) Phase of the AAA V program can be divided into 
two parts. The first part was to define the problem and explore different alternatives 
while the second part was to exploit the knowledge gained during the Technology Base 
Development Program and use it to reduce the risk of the preferred alternative selected. 
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The high-water speed approach was detennined to be technically feasible as a 
result of the progress being made in the Technology Base Development Program. [Ref. 
5:p. 2] However, it was realized that there were differing technical approaches, such as 
AAI's planing-hull technology or FMC Corporation's hydrofoil-assisted planing-hull, 
that could be taken to satisfy the necessary perfonnance requirements.[Ref. 5:p. 2] 
a. Part One 
The problem that was tackled during this part of the CE phase was 
centered around the AAA V system mission. The first set of contracts was awarded to 
FMC and General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) in February and April 1990 
respectively.[Ref. 5:p. 2] These first contracts were Finn-Fixed-Price (FFP) and were 
awarded for $1.5 million each. The contracts were awarded by the NA VSEA contracting 
officer supporting PMS-31 O. 
The purpose of the first set of contracts was to gain industry input into the 
different technical approaches and cost uncertainties.[Ref. 5:p. 2] Under these first study 
contracts, FMS and GDLS were each tasked with developing concept designs; cost 
estimates, development plans, tow tank test models of their proposed design, armor 
samples, and a full-scale mock-up.[Ref. 34] 
The existing requirement to award a cost-type contract for this research 
effort did, not apply to these contracts for two reasons. First, they were less than $10 
million threshold at the time for mandatory cost-type contracts.[Ref. 35] Second, a fair 
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and reasonable price was established by the Government based on historical cost data for 
this type of study. [Ref. 36: p. B-13] 
As the CE Phase progressed, the initial Cost and Operational Effectiveness 
Analysis (COEA) was completed in March 1991.[Ref. 29] The COEA evaluated 13 
different alternatives that included high-water speed amphibians, low-water speed 
amphibians, non-amphibians (i.e. armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles) 
and non-vehicles (i.e. all air via helicopters or all surface via LCAC).[Ref. 29] The 
results of the COEA clearly showed that a self-deploying high-water speed amphibian 
(the AAAV) was the overall superior choice by a considerable margin. [Ref. 37] 
Additionally, the AAA V alternative was found not to be the most expensive alternative as 
many had expected. [Ref. 37] 
h. Part Two 
A Marine Corps Program Decision Meeting (MCPDM), chaired by the 
ASN(RDA), Mr. Cann, was conducted on 11 April 1991. The MCPDM was held in 
preparation for the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) Milestone I review of the program 
on 29 May 1991. The result of the MCPDM was that ASN(RDA) required that an 
independent technical assessment of the program be conducted prior to moving further 
through the Milestone I DAB process, due to the perceived technical risks associated with 
the new AAAV.[Ref. 38:p. 1] 
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The ASN(RDA) tasked the Office of Naval Research's (ONR) Office of 
Advanced Technology (OAT) to conduct an independent "Red Team" assessment of 
FMC's and GDLS's AAAV designs and the program. [Ref. 38:p. 1] The Red Team 
assessment, completed in July 1991, identified three chief areas of technical risk 
regarding the two competing contractors designs and made seven recommendations for 
mitigating or eliminating the risk.[Ref. 38:p. 1] 
Following the "Red Team" assessment, the DRPM, AAA awarded FMC 
and GDLS follow-on contracts that focused on conducting technical risk reducing 
experiments. [Ref. 38:p. 1] The follow-on CPFF contracts were awarded in September 
1991. Since these contracts were not competitively awarded, a class Justification and 
Approval (J&A) was approved by ASN(RDA).[Ref. 39] The MCRDAC Contracting 
Officer supporting the AAA V program awarded these contracts. These contracts 
included the fabrication and testing of near-full scale hydrodynamic test rigs of the 
contractor's own design and numerous other activities focused on all areas of technical 
risk.[Ref. 38:p. 1] 
In 1992, ONR held a second "Red Team" technical assessment which was 
completed in November 1992.[Ref. 29] This assessment evaluated the contractors' new 
AAAV designs and the results of their technical risk reducing activities. [Ref. 38:p. 2] 
The assessment included the following findings and recommendations: [Ref. 29] 
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- The risk reducing initiatives and action taken by the AAA V Program 
Office since the ONR July 1991 technical assessment have resulted in the 
elimination of high risk areas in both the FMC and GDLS baseline 
concepts for the AAA V. 
- Initiate full-scale prototype design, development and testing. 
The final set of CE contracts was awarded to GDLS and FMC in July 
1993. These non-competitive follow-on contracts were CPFF contracts awarded by 
MCRDAC. The purpose of the contracts was to have both contractors continue with their 
technical risk reducing activities and to build and test full-scale automotive test rigs. 
In December 1994, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) issued 
Program Decision Memorandum 4 (PDM-4). This decision took $190 million in funding 
away from the AAA V Program during Fiscal Year (FY) 1996 through FY 2001. [Ref. 40] 
No contractual actions, such as contract repricing or descoping, were required as a result 
of this funding decrease. [Ref. 35] However, PDM-4 did increase the period of the 
Concept Demonstration and Validation (CDN) phase of the program by over two 
additional years to 72 months. [Ref. 40] 
3. Concept Demonstration and Validation Contract 
The AAAV Program was approved by the DAB on 15 March 1995 and the ADM 
was signed on 17 March 1995 giving Milestone I approval and allowing the program to 
enter into the CDN phase of the program. Because of the substantial effort made to 
reduce the technical risk of the program and the similarity of the two contractors' designs, 
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the decision was made to go ahead and down-select to one contractor during CDN 
instead of at least two as had been planned in the Acquisition Strategy.[Ref. 7] 
The Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued on June 30, 1995 requesting 
submission of "detailed technical, management and cost proposals for the design and 
development of AAA V prototypes and associated engineering and development efforts 
during the CDN phase of the AAAV program".[Ref. 41:p. 1] Competition was limited 
to GDLS and United Defense Limited Partnership (UDLP) (formerly known as FMC), 
the two companies that had participated with the CE phase development of the AAA V. 
Both offerors submitted their initial TechnicallManagement Proposals on 29 September 
1995 and detailed cost proposals on 16 October 1995. From 9 September through 22 
December 1995 the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) evaluated each proposal 
in accordance with detailed, pre-determined evaluation standards for each factorlsub-
factor.[Ref. 41 :p. 2] 
In October 1995, PDM-2 was issued restoring $107 million of the $190 million 
reduced FY-96 through FY-Ol funding stream caused by PDM-4. The increased funding 
caused a reduction in the CDN phase from a 72-month performance period to only 62 
months. [Ref. 41 :p. 3] As a result of the acceleration of the period of performance and 
numerous exceptions in both proposals to the terms and conditions of the solicitation, an 
amendment to the RFP was issued on 14 December 1995.[Ref. 41:pg. 3] The amendment 
provided significant additional instructions to the offerors regarding cost information to 
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be provided with their revised proposals in order to clarify problems encountered in the 
initial cost evaluation.[Ref. 41 :p. 3] 
Both GDLS and UDLP responded to the amended RFP with new cost proposals. 
These new proposals were both determined by the PCO and PM to have total estimated 
costs significantly below that which the Government believed to be reasonably necessary 
to successfully complete the required effort during CDN.[Ref. 42] According to the PM, 
contractor "buy-in", and not having a process in place to catch it, was a primary concern. 
[Ref. 7] The FAR defines "buying-in" as [Ref. 43:part 3.501-1]: 
... submitting an offer below anticipated costs expecting to increase the 
contract amount after award (e.g., through unnecessary or excessively 
priced change orders) or to receive follow-on contracts at artificially high 
prices to recover losses incurred on the buy-in contract. 
The PM was concerned about contractor buy-in because of the detrimental effect 
cost overruns would have on the program and the fact that the Marine Corps, with its 
limited budget, would not have the fiscal resources or flexibility to recover.[Ref. 7] 
The PM made the decision to show GDLS and UDLP that their technical 
proposals did not match their cost proposals. He did this by providing each of the 
offerors a Government cost estimate based on their own technical proposal which showed 
they both had significantly underestimated their cost of performance. [Ref. 7] Finally, the 
PM challenged the two contractors to either prove that the Government estimates were 
wrong or to increase their proposed cost in their Best And Final Offer (BAFO). As a 
result of this challenge, both offerors increased their proposed price approximately $40 
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million on their BAFO.[Ref. 7] The source selection evaluation process was completed 
and the Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) report was issued to the Source 
Selection Authority (SSA) on June 10, 1996. [Ref. 41 :p. 1] The SSAC recommended that 
GDLS be selected due to their technically superior proposal which was significantly less 
cost than UDLP's.[Ref. 41:p. 7] The CDN contract was awarded to GDLS on June 13, 
1996. [Ref. 44] 
C. CONTRACTING ORGANIZATION 
The contracts in support of the AAA V Program have been awarded by several 
different organizations. The contracts that supported the Technology Base Development 
Program from 1985 through 1992 were awarded by DTRC.[Ref. 30] Contracts awarded 
during the CE phase while the AAA V program belonged to PMS-310 at Naval Sea 
Systems Command (NA VSEA) were awarded by the NA VSEA contracting officer 
matrixed to support the AAAV program. [Ref. 45] Contracts in support of engine 
development within the United States at John Deere, Incorporated, were awarded by 
NA VSEA while contracts for engine development in Germany at the Motorine Turbine 
Union (MTU) were awarded by the Naval Regional Contracting Center (NRCC) Naples, 
Detachment London. After the PM, AAA moved from NA VSEA to MCRDAC in 1990, 
overall responsibility for contracting moved to MCRDAC as well.[Ref. 6] 
The only Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) involvement with 
the AAA V related contracts during the Technology Base Development Program or the 
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the CE phase was with the three sets of CE contracts.[Ref. 8 and Ref. 30] Contract 
administration was provided by DCMC personnel at the FMC facility in San Jose, 
California and by DCMC personnel at the GDLS facility in Sterling Heights, Michigan. 
[Ref. 8] 
The CDN contract was awarded by the AAA V Procuring Contracting Officer 
(PCO) matrixed from the Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) in 
Quantico, Virginia. In addition to the PCO, there are two other sections which are 
involved in managing the CDN contract: the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) 
and a Contracts Management section within the AAA V Program Management Office 
(PMO). 
1. The Administrative Contracting Officer 
The Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) is collocated with the AAA V 
PMO and is matrixed from DCMC Manassas, Virginia. The ACO serves as the primary 
DCMC interface with the PCO.[Ref. 46:p. 5] One Procurement Technician assists the 
ACO. [Ref. 46:p. 8] The two of them are members of the DCMC Program Support 
Team (PST) consisting of a total of eight DCMC personnel assigned to support the 
AAA V program.[Ref. 46:p.1 0] 
A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed on August 26, 1997, outlining 
the relationship between the AAA V PMO and the DCMC PST. [Ref. 46:p. 1] The 
following responsibilities of the ACO are listed in the MOA: [Ref. 46:p. 5] 
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1. Provides pncmg support to the PCO negotIatIOns and execute 
contractual documents for settlement of efforts delegated to the ACO by 
the PCO for definitization. 
2. Serve as the primary interface with GDLS Divisional Administrative 
Contracting Officer (DACO) and General Dynamics Defense Corporate 
Executive (DCE). Apprise the PCO and Contract Manager of corporate 
and GDLS issues, especially if the issues impact rates/proposal estimates. 
Verify GDAMS Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) or Forward 
Pricing Rate Recommendation (FPRR) prior to concurrent pricing 
arrangement on contract changes/additional contract work. 
3. Request Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) support as needed. 
4. Participate in concurrent pricing activities within the IPT structure, as 
required. 
5. Support the DRPM Office estimating and budgeting, when requested, 
by reviewing contractor rate data and interface with DCAA. 
6. Execute Single Process Initiative contract modifications. 
7. Support the DRPM Contract Manager and the PCO on major 
contracting issues as appropriate. 
8. Provide A ward Fee inputs, as required. 
9. Participate in milestone reviews and program reviews, as required. 
10. Support the DRPM Business and Financial Management Office 
primarily in the areas of expenditures. 
2. Contract Management Section 
The AAAV PMO is organized around seven functional directorates (see 
organizational chart shown in Appendix B) which comprise the Program Management 
Team (PMT) supporting the Program Manager. One of the seven elements is the 
Contract Manager. 
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The Contract Manager is responsible for contract activities directly related to the 
CDN contract performance to include Earned Value Management; cost estimating and 
analysis; performance terms and conditions; and interaction with the DCMC PST. [Ref. 
35] The specific duties and responsibilities of the Contract Manager as defined by the 
PM are shown in Appendix C. A Procurement Analyst and a Cost Performance Analyst 
assist the Contract Manager. Both the Contract Manager and the Procurement Analyst 
billets are trained contract specialists (General Series 1102).[Ref. 47] 
D. CONTRACT TYPES 
The AAA V Program has used both fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contract 
types to acquire goods and services. This portion of this chapter will explain the contract 
types most commonly used by the AAA V Program and describe when ·they were used. 
1. Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts 
A Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contract is .used when the risk involved is minimal or 
can be reasonably predicted. [Ref. 1 :p. 73] In an FFP contract, the Government (the 
buyer) and the contractor (the seller) agree to a price for the item or service before the 
contract is awarded and that price remains in effect for the duration of the contract. [Ref. 
1 :p. 77] The contractor accepts full cost responsibility with an FFP contract and is 
rewarded with greater profit if its costs are controlled. At the same time, an FFP contract 
requires only minimal administrative oversight by the Government.[Ref. 48:p. 4-14] An 
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FFP contract is best suited for a situation where there are clear specifications and the 
price can be realistically determined beforehand. [Ref. 48 :p. 4-19] 
Within the AAA V Program FFP contracts have only been used five times. 
During the Technology Base Development Program only one FFP contract was used to 
procure a component. [Ref. 30] Firm-Fixed-Price contracts were used during the CE 
Phase for the first set of exploratory contracts awarded to FMC and GDLS.[Ref. 49] 
Finally, two, of the engine development contracts with the Motorine Turbine Union 
(MTU) awarded by NRCC Naples, Detachment London were FFP.[Ref. 49] 
2. Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 
A cost-reimbursement type contract is used when the costs associated with 
contract performance are uncertain and cannot be reasonably estimated.[Ref. 48:p. 4-18] 
A cost-reimbursement contract can be used under the following conditions:[Ref. 48:p. 4-
18] 
1. The contractor's accounting system is adequate for determining costs 
applicable to the contract. 
2. Appropriate surveillance by Government personnel during contract 
performance can be maintained to give reasonable assurance that 
inefficient or wasteful methods are not being used. 
3. It can be shown that a cost-reimbursement contract is less costly than 
another type of contract and also that the subject of the procurement could 
not practically be obtained without using such a contract. 
4. Statutory limits on price or fee are taken into account. 
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Cost-reimbursement type contracts reimburse the contractor for all of their 
reasonable, allowable, and allocable costs incurred during the performance of the contract 
and then pay them a fee or profit. [Ref. 1 :p. 81] There are several different types of cost-
reimbursement type contracts available to the contracting officer. The most commonly 
used cost-reimbursement contract is the Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract.[Ref. 48:p. 
4-21] The CPFF contract has also been the most commonly used contract type in support 
of the AAA V program. 
a. Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contract 
According to the FAR, a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract is a [Ref. 43: part 
16.306]: 
... cost-reimbursement contract that provides for payment to the contractor 
of a negotiated fee that is fixed at the inception of the contract. The fixed 
fee does not vary with actual cost, but may be adjusted as a result of 
changes in the work to be performed under the contract. This contract 
type permits contracting for efforts that might otherwise present too great 
a risk to contractors, but it provides the contractor only a minimum 
incentive to control costs. 
The CPFF is typically used during the developmental phases of an MDAP 
because of the uncertainty that lies within the program, especially one that is facing 
technological challenges.[Ref. 1 :p. 81] The primary reason a CPFF contract is used here 
is that, in order to compensate for the cost uncertainties borne by the contractor, all of the 
cost responsibility falls on the Government. The downside of the CPFF contract type to 
the Government is that the contractor has virtually no incentive to control costs since he 
51 
will be getting his costs covered plus a set, fixed fee. According to FAR Part 16.306, the 
fixed-fee could be up to fifteen percent of the initially contracted costs for a development 
contract. A CPFF contract should not be used in a program once concept exploration 
indicates that engineering development is now feasible.[Ref. 1 :p. 76] At this stage of a 
program, another contract type, such as an incentive-type contract like a cost-plus-award-
fee (CPAF) or cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contract, may be more suitable. 
b. Cost-Plus-A ward-Fee Contract 
A Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract was chosen for the Concept 
DemonstrationIV alidation (CON) Phase of the AAA V program. The FAR describes 
CPAF contracts as [Ref. 43:part 16.405-2]: 
... cost-reimbursement contract that provides for a fee consisting of a base 
amount fixed at inception of the contract and an award amount that the 
contractor may earn in whole or in part during performance and that is 
sufficient to provide motivation for excellence in such areas as quality, 
timeliness, technical ingenuity, and cost-effective management. The 
amount of the award fee to be paid is determined by the Government's 
judgmental evaluation of the contractor's performance in terms of the 
criteria stated in the contract. This determination is made unilaterally by 
the Government and is not subject to the Disputes clause. 
The FAR states the CPAF contract is most suitable for use when [Ref. 43: 
part 16.405-2(b)(l)(ii)]: 
... the likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives will be enhanced by 
using a contract that effectively motivates the contractor toward 
exceptional performance and provides the Government with the flexibility 
to evaluate both actual performance and the conditions under which it was 
achieved. 
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The FAR goes on to state that the CPFF contracts should only be used when the 
"additional administrative effort and cost required to monitor and evaluate performance 
are justified by the expected benefits." [Ref. 43 :part 16] 
A CP AF contract will have contractor evaluations performed at stated intervals 
throughout the contract period. This ensures that the contractor is periodically informed 
of the quality of its performance and can take corrective action, if necessary, to improve 
performance where required. Payment of the award fee coincides with the performance 
during each evaluation period. This incentivizes the contractor by rewarding outstanding 
performance through payment of the award fee and penalizing average or substandard 
performance through non-payment of the award fee for that period. 
Until recent legislation removed this restriction, CP AF contract award fees were 
subject to the same fee limitations as the CPFF contract. For this type of MDAP, the 
maximum base fee plus award fee could not exceed fifteen percent of the contract costs. 
The base fee still cannot exceed three percent of the total estimated cost.[Ref. 43:part 
15.903(d)(l)(i) and Ref. 50:part 216.404-2(c)(ii)(2)(b)] An Award Fee Review Board 
(AFRB) conducts the evaluation of the contractor's performance. The AFRB reviews the 
contractor's performance during each evaluation period and makes a recommendation to 
the Fee Determination Official (FDO) of the resulting award fee amount. The FDO has 
the final say as to how much, if any, award fee to award the contractor each period. 
Finally, the FDO's decision is not subject to the Disputes Clause of a contract. This 
means that the FDO's decision is final and the contractor knows that he must meet the 
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standards as outlined in the Award Fee plan. The FDO for the AAA V Program is the 
Program Manager.[Ref. 7] 
E. CONTRACT CLAUSES 
In addition to the body of the contract which is written to explain what work the 
Government expects the contractor to perform there are a number of clauses mandating 
the contractor to abide by additional requirements. FAR part 52.101 defines a contract 
clause as "a term or condition used in contracts or in both solicitations and contracts, and 
applying after contract award or both before and after award." The AAAV CDN contract 
had several unique clauses in both the solicitation and in the contract awarded to GDLS. 
These unique clauses called for a specific geographic location of the GDLS facility; 
collocation of the AAA V PMO with the contractor; the use of Integrated Product and 
Process Development (lPPD) and Integrated Product Teams (lPTs); cost sharing with 
GDLS; and a special provision regarding AAA V system design decisions. These unique 
clauses are addressed in the following sections. 
1. Location/Collocation 
The Request For Proposal (RFP) for the Concept DemonstrationNalidation 
(CDN) contract required the contractor to locate their research and development facility 
"within 20 minutes by car of Springfield, Virginia, the intersection of Interstate 95, 395 
and 495." [Ref. 51] The contractor was further required to have all key personnel (listed 
in the Key Personnel clause of the contract) located at this facility full time. [Ref. 51] 
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Finally, the contractor was required to provide the AAAV PMO with office space 
(including offices, spaces, furniture and equipment) collocated at the contractor's facility. 
[Ref. 51] This is the first time that a Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) has 
been completely collocated with the prime contractor and its major subcontractors.[Ref. 
52] 
This geographic location was chosen for several reasons. First, it was 
conveniently located to both Washington, D.C., and Quantico, Virginia. Being close to 
Washington was advantageous because of the frequent interaction that is required with 
the various Department of Defense, Department of the Navy, and congressional staffs. 
Being close to Quantico was advantageous because of the various Marine Corps 
activities, such as the Marine Corps Systems Command and the Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, that are located there. Another benefit of being close to 
Quantico is that there is a platoon of AA V7Als located at The Basic School, providing 
the AAA V PMO with a ready pool of enlisted Marines with amphibious vehicle expertise 
to participate in the user testing required during the CDN phase. The second reason that 
the PM wanted to specify this geographic location is that it required either offeror, GDLS 
or UDLP, to relocate to a new facility away from their corporate headquarters. [Ref. 7] 
The new location would become "neutral ground" for everyone involved on both sides of 
the AAA V project.[Ref. 7] This move was necessary to help create a "cultural change" 
that the PM envisioned. [Ref. 7] This cultural change would come about through 
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collocation and the use of an Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) 
process with Integrated Product Teams (lPTs). 
The Government had developed a unique technical knowledge of high-water 
speed amphibians as a result of its involvement in the canceled LV A program and the 
successful Technology Base Development Program. [Ref. 7] By collocating, the 
Government would be better able to impart that knowledge to the contractor. An 
additional benefit was that through the daily interaction that was inevitable with 
collocation, the Government wanted the contractor to get to know their "customer", the 
Marine Corps, better.[Ref. 7] The PM felt that by having the GDLS employees "observe 
what Marines are all about" and being "exposed to the Marine Corps culture" they would 
"gain a clear understanding of who Marines are" and design a better AAAV.[Ref. 7] 
The PM began a program to educate the contractor on the operating environment; 
vehicle uses; problems and strengths of the existing AAV7Al; u.s. Marine Corps 
amphibious doctrine; and amphibious warfighting scenarios. [Ref. 52] He took all of the 
GDLS employees, and the civilian Government employees, to Norfolk, Virginia, where 
they spent a night aboard an amphibious ship in the same berthing areas that enlisted 
Marines would sleep. The next morning, they conducted a mock amphibious landing 
using AA V7 Al s and were able to drive them on the beach if they desired. According to 
the GDLS contracts manager, this was the first time in over 20 years of experience with 
the Government that he was able to do anything like this.[Ref. 53] On another occasion 
the PM had a Marine Corps corporal who had almost drowned in an incident where an 
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AAV7Al sank, speak about the experience to the GDLS employees. [Ref. 7] These 
experiences gave the GDLS employees a unique perspective on the performance 
requirements of the system they were designing and building.[Ref. 53] The PM also had 
the GDLS employees attend a Marine Corps live-fire demonstration in Quantico so that 
they could see actual combat weapons being used. The PM invited the GDLS employees 
to a Marine Corps Mess Night so they could experience first-hand the camaraderie of the 
Marines.[Ref. 7] Finally, the Marine Officers in the AAAV PMO gave classes on 
Marine Corps leadership principles to the GDLS employees. These classes were 
especially useful for the newly appointed IPT leaders. 
2. Teaming 
One of the benefits of collocation is that it facilitates the use of IPPD and IPTs. 
The CDN contract requires that the Government and the contractor agree to "utilize an 
Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) approach including the concept of 
'TEAMING' in managing the program." [Ref. 54:p. H-24] Integrated Product and 
Process Development is defined by as [Ref. 55]: 
... a management technique that integrates all acquisition activities starting 
with requirements definition through production, fielding/deployment and 
operational support in order to optimize the design, manufacturing, 
business, and supportability processes. At the core of IPPD 
implementation are Integrated Product Teams (lPTs). 
The DOD 5000.1 also directs program managers to use the concept of IPPD throughout 
the acquisition process to the maximum extent practicable. 
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The contract also requires that at a minimum the contractor "shall have an IPT 
that corresponds to each second level element of the vehicle Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS)."[Ref.54] The Integrated Product Team (lPT) is described as [Ref. 55]: 
... composed of representatives from all appropriate functional disciplines 
working together with a Team Leader to build successful and balanced 
programs, identify and resolve issues, and make sound and timely 
recommendations to facilitate decision-making. There are three types of 
IPTs: Overarching IPTs focus on strategic guidance, program assessment, 
and issue resolution. Working Level IPTs identify and resolve program 
issues, determine program status, and seek opportunities for acquisition 
reform. Program IPTs focus on program execution, and may include 
representatives from both Government, and after contract award, industry. 
The AAA V program uses 28 IPTs (shown in Appendix D) broken down into four 
levels: "A" through "D". The one "A" level IPT, the AAA V System IPT, is the highest 
level IPT while the 14 "D" level IPTs are at the "product" level.[Ref. 53] Each IPT is a 
multidisciplinary team with' members from engineering, finance, quality assurance, 
procurement, etc.[Ref. 53] Each IPT is led by a GDLS employee who has a Government 
counterpart. The roles and responsibilities for Government participation on IPTs at the 
AAA V program is shown in Appendix E. 
Primarily, the Government members on the IPTs serve as "customer" 
representatives. They are there to facilitate GDLS personnel getting information faster, 
thereby reducing cycle time. [Ref. 56] The Government members can provide their 
personal opinion or offer an "expert' opinion when asked by GDLS for the "Government 
position" or for an interpretation of the work required by the contract. [Ref. 56] The 
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Government members are not on the IPT to do any of GDLS's work as required by the 
contact. Finally, Government members cannot authorize any changes or deviations from 
the contract's SOW or authorize GDLS to perfonn additional work. 
The use of IPPDIIPTs was new to both GDLS and the AAA V PMO.[Ref. 7] The 
personnel, though experienced in acquisition, were not used to working in an IPT 
environment. Having an expert consulting firm conduct training on IPTs solved this lack 
of experience.[Ref. 57] This training also established a baseline for both the GDLS 
employees and the AAA V PMO to build on. [Ref. 7] However, the training did not take 
place until six months after the collocation and IPT arrangement began. [Ref. 57] One 
thing that was learned soon after the IPTs began was that not everyone is cut out to be an 
IPT leader, requiring several personnel to be reassigned. [Ref. 53] 
3. Contractor Cost Sharing 
As part of their contract proposal, General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) 
proposed a unique cost sharing arrangement with the Government that was included in 
the contract. The complete clause is shown in Appendix F. As with most cost-
reimbursement type contracts, the Government will reimburse GDLS for all allowable, 
allocable and reasonable costs, and pay them the appropriate Base Fee and Facilities 
Capital Cost of Money (FCCM). The original contract cost/fee arrangement shows a 
Total Estimated Cost (TEC) of $214,826,694 for Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINs) 
0001 and 0002. These CLIN s are for the Demonstration and Validation of the AAA V in 
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accordance with the contract Statement of Work and the associated Technical Data 
requirements. However, according to the Cost Sharing clause, the Government is only 
required to reimburse GDLS for these costs up to $205,007,988. The cost-sharing clause 
requires the contractor to then absorb all costs over $205,007,988 up to $214,826,694. 
Then, should the costs be greater than had originally been projected, the Government will 
then again reimburse GDLS for their costs over $214,826,694. The net result is a 
potential cost saving to the Government of almost $10 million while at the same time 
providing a powerful incentive for GDLS to reduce costs. The contractor will, however, 
still receive its base fee and any award fee while it is sharing costs with the 
Government.[Ref. 58] 
Cost sharing in of itself is not unique. The FAR defines cost sharing as "an 
explicit arrangement under which the contractor bears some of the burden of reasonable, 
allocable, and allowable contract cost [Ref. 43:part 35.001]." Cost Sharing is also 
addressed in the FAR where it is described as a "cost-reimbursement contract in which 
the contractor receives no fee and is reimbursed only for an agreed-upon portion of its 
allowable costs."[Ref. 43:part 16.303] Typically, cost-sharing occurs when the 
Government contracts with a Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
(FFRDC) or other non-profit agency. 
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4. AAA V System Design Decisions 
After the CDN contract was awarded, an additional clause was added to 
encourage GDLS to make trade-offs which, while costing the Government more during 
the CDN phase, would reduce costs in other phases of the program or Life Cycle Costs 
(LCC).[Ref. 58] The clause titled "Special Provision Regarding AAAV System Design 
Decisions" is shown in Appendix G. This clause was intended by the PM to move away 
from the "phony" trade studies that are typically conducted in an MDAP.[Ref. 7] 
The System Design Decision provision encourages the contractor to submit to the 
Government trade-off decisions (referred to as "trades") that will be beneficial to the 
Government. These trades are different than normal contract changes because they 
require the contractor to give something up.[Ref. 7] The GDLS contract manager 
describes this new contract provision in this way [Ref. 53]: 
Traditionally, without this new contract provision, if you made a trade 
decision that has a Life Cycle Cost benefit but cost more in the current 
contract (in this case DEMN AL) that cost increase would contribute to 
cost growth or overrun. In our case we have created a new contract 
provision that allows us to adjust the instant contract finances for the 
impact of that trade decision. This helps in making the appropriate design 
decision in the long run without adversely impacting the instant contract 
financials. 
Here are two examples of how this new provision was applied. In the first 
example, a trade study was conducted on the Hydrodynamic Suspension Unit (HSU) to 
determine whether the GDLS baseline unit was better than several competitors' 
proposals.[Ref. 59] It was determined that an HSU designed by a competitor would offer 
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better reliability, weigh less, have better mass production abilities and result in Life Cycle 
Cost (LCC) savings of over $205 million.[Ref. 59] However, switching to the new HSU 
would increase the cost of the current contract by $2 million. GDLS offered this change 
which was accepted by the PM using the System Design Decision provision of the 
contract.[Ref. 59] 
In the second example, the original baseline transmission proposed was a four-
speed transI)1ission provided by Allison Transmissions. [Ref. 59] A trade study was 
conducted to see if the baseline transmission or another built by Allison was a better 
value. The trade study concluded that a six-speed transmission produced by Allison, 
which already had been proven in commercial applications, was the better choice. [Ref. 
59] As an example of the Government involvement in the IPT process, when Allison 
briefed GDLS on the transmission, a Government drive train engineer, a logistician, and a 
Marine Corps Maintenance Officer were present to ask questions and to see for 
themselves that the six-speed transmission was better.[Ref. 59] By increasing the CDN 
contract by $4.2 million, the Marine Corps will save over $41 million in production costs 
and $71 million in LCC.[Ref. 59] 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has examined the Technology Base Development Program, the 
Concept Exploration phase, and the Concept Demonstration and Validation phase of the 
Advanced Assault Amphibious Vehicle program. Next, it described the types of 
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contracts used during each of these phases of the program and who awarded the contracts. 
This chapter then described the organizational structure of the AAA V Program 
Management Office and examined the unique contract clauses found in the CDN 
contract. 
The next chapter will analyze the contracting decisions and their impact on the 
AAA V program. 
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IV. AAA V CRITICAL CONTRACTING DECISIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyze the contracting decisions that were presented in the 
previous chapters explaining the background of the Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAA V) program. The focus of the analysis will be on the contracting 
organization, contract types used, and the impact of the unique contract clauses used by . 
the AAA V Program Management Office (PMO). 
B. CONTRACTING ORGANIZATION 
The AAA V program is unique in that it has the Procuring Contracting Officer 
(PCO), the Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO) and a Contract Manager all 
collocated within the same PMO. No other Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) 
is arranged this way. This section will examine the advantages and disadvantages 
associated with the collocation ofthese contract-related sections. 
1. Defense Contract Management Command Relationship 
The Defense Contract Management Command (DCMC) Program Support Team 
(PST) consists of eight personnel that are collocated with the AAA V Program 
Management Office (PMO). In addition to the ACO and a procurement technician; there 
are three engineers, a Government property specialist, a software specialist and the 
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Program Integrator (PI) assigned to the PST. These personnel are not chargeable to the 
Program Manager's (PM) Table of Organization (T/O). If DCMC did not provide these 
personnel, the researcher believes that the Marine Corps would not be able to afford 
replacing them on a one-for-one basis with new PMO personnel. As such, the PST 
provides the PM a tremendous benefit in terms of personnel resources. Additionally, 
because of the collocation and daily interaction with PMO personnel, the PST has a better 
understanding of the PMO than they would if located elsewhere and is more likely to feel 
like a member of the PMO "team." 
The collocation affords the ACO a unique opportunity to interact daily with both 
the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) and the contractor in all contracting matters. As 
a result of the Integrated Product Team (lPT) concept used at the AAA V PMO and the 
daily interaction with the contractor, the ACO is able to complete tasks, such as contract 
modifications, in a much more timely fashion than would be able if not collocated. 
Because of the collocation, documents can be routed between the various offices within 
the AAA V PMO (e.g., ACO, PCO, GDLS, finance) quickly instead of being mailed and 
. issues resolved by face-to-face meetings instead of over the telephone. Because of the 
collocation, it is much easier for the ACO to remain informed as to the program decisions 
being made that will result in contract modifications. The use of IPTs has allowed the 
ACO to use a process, similar to "Alpha Contracting", where the contractor is involved in 
the contract modification process, providing important input and recommendations in 
every step along the way. By the time a modification, such as for a design change, 
66 
reaches the Program Manager for a decision it has already been staffed and evaluated by 
both the contractor and Government teams. All the PM has to do is agree or disagree 
without having to route the request through the PMO. This process has significantly 
reduced cycle time. 
2. Contract Manager 
The Contract Manager, who heads the Contract Management section, provides 
additional contract related expertise to the AAAV PMO. The Contract Management 
section is not typically found in a PMO. In other PMOs, usually the Business and 
Finance section does much of the work performed by this section. Typically, the 
BusinesslFinancial Manager (BFIM) provides additional contract assistance as a 
collateral duty in areas such as earned value management for the PM and without the 
benefit of formal contract training and experience. 
Since the Contract Manager is not matrixed from another organization and works 
directly for PM, she can be assigned whatever duties the PM desires. This affords the 
PM a great deal of flexibility regarding contracting, since the other contract personnel 
(ACO and PCO) are matrixed into the PMO. The Contract Manager is responsible for 
handling the administrative requirements of the award fee process for the Concept 
Demonstration and Validation (CDN) phase Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract. 
This role is important because of the extra administrative effort a CP AF contract requires. 
The Contract Manager is responsible for collecting monthly comments on the 
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contractor's performance from the Program Management Team members, consolidating 
the reports and drafting a letter for the PM that appraises the contractor of their 
performance for the previous month. If the Contract Manager were not resident in the 
AAA V PMO, this administrative burden would fall on another section. Additionally, the 
Contract Manager is a voting member on the Award Fee Determination Board. Some of 
the other areas in which the Contract Manager provides expertise are preparing and 
coordinating modification requests, reviewing cost performance reports provided by the 
contractor, and analyzing/projecting cost growth and variances. Also, the Contract 
Manager provides a valuable second opinion, if needed, by the PCO and ACO since they 
are both matrixed away from their parent contracting organization. 
There are potential drawbacks of having a separate, dedicated Contract 
Management Section within the PMO. First, since the title "Contract Manager" is not 
typically found in a PMO, it could cause confusion to an outsider unfamiliar with the 
organizational structure of the AAA V program. There are no indications, however, that 
the separate Contract Management section has been confused with the PCO or ACO. 
Second, the potential exists for conflict to arise between the Contract Manager and the 
pco or the Contract Manager and the ACO. An example of a conflict could be the 
contractor addressing an issue to the Contract Manager instead of going to either the PCO 
or ACO, as appropriate. Another example of conflict could be the Contract Manager 
performing a duty that would normally be assigned to the PCO or ACO, like tracking 
payment to the contractor, which is an ACO responsibility. The AAAV PMO has several 
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mechanisms in place that helps minimize the potential for conflict to exist. To begin 
with, the IPT environment helps keep everyone informed as to what is occurring on a 
daily basis and the regular meetings help keep communications open. Next, formally 
documenting individual roles and responsibilities helps minimize conflict as well. The 
Contract Manager's responsibilities, shown in Appendix C, have been formally published 
by the PM. Also, a Memorandum of Agreement between the PM and the Defense 
Contract Management Command define the responsibilities of the ACO. These clearly 
defined responsibilities designate which contract section is responsible for which duties, 
thereby minimizing potential conflicts. The researcher did not find any evidence that 
there has been any conflicts that have arisen between the Contract Manager and the PCO 
or ACO. 
C. CONTRACT TYPE DETERMINATION 
The AAA V PMO, and the organizations supporting the AAA V program, have 
used three different contract types in the contracts awarded to support the program thus 
far. The three contract types are the Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contract, the Cost-Plus-
Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract and the Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract. The next 
section of this chapter will examine the use of these three contract types and other 
contracting alternatives available. 
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1. Use of Firm-Fixed-Price Contracts 
A Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) contract has been used only five times during the 
history of the AAA V program. During the Technology Base Development portion of the 
program, a FFP contract was awarded to FMC to procure a new type of aluminum track 
that would save weight on the future AAAV. During the Concept Exploration (CE) 
phase of the program, a FFP contract was awarded to FMC and GDLS each to develop 
conceptual designs for the AAA V. Also during the CE phase, two FFP contracts were 
awarded to Motoren und Turbinen Union (MTU) for engine development. In each of 
these five cases, all of the contracts were completed within the original price of the 
contract and the Government's requirements were met. 
An analysis of these FFP contracts shows that FFP contracts can be used 
successfully during the research and development of a major defense system if certain 
conditions are met. First, the PMO must adequately define the requirement, as was the 
case with the aluminum track contract. Second, the Government must ensure that the 
contractor understands that the contract price is indeed firm. This was the case with the 
two CE phase conceptual design contracts. The Government made it clear to both 
contractors that the price was firm and both adhered to the contracted price, while still 
meeting all of the Government requirements. Finally, contractors with a history of 
meeting. Government's requirements within contracted price should be given favorable 
consideration when evaluating past performance. This applies in the case of the two 
engine development contracts awarded to MTU. According to PMO personnel, MTU has 
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a history of completing contracts, even cost-reimbursement type contracts, under the 
initially awarded contract price. 
2. Use of Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee Contracts 
The Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) contract is the most commonly used type of 
contract in the developmen.tal stages of Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). 
The CPFF contract has also been used extensively (over twenty times) throughout the 
Technology Base Development Program and in the CE phase of the AAAV program. 
Additionally, even though the contracts in support of the AAA V program were awarded 
by the Naval Sea Systems Command (NA VSEA); the Navy Regional Contracting Center 
(NRCC) , Detachment, London; and the Marine Corps Research, Development and 
Acquisition Command (MCRDAC); all of these organizations saw fit to use CPFF 
contracts during the early stages of the program. 
One benefit of a CPFF contract is that it requires less administrative effort than 
the other cost-reimbursement type contracts. This is because the CPFF contract pays the 
. contractor a set, fixed-fee, regardless of the costs incurred. With a CPFF contract, the 
program office does not have the extensive administrative burden required by the award 
fee process of a CP AF contract. Minimizing the administrative effort required to manage 
a contract was important in the early stages of the AAA V program since there were only 
limited PMO personnel available to handle the administrative requirements of managing 
the contract. Also, not having to worry about administrative requirements freed the PMO 
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personnel to focus on other programmatic issues. Other cost-type contracts, like CPIF or 
CP AF contracts, could have been used instead of the CPFF contract. 
Despite its extensive use, the CPFF contract type has a significant disadvantage 
over other cost-reimbursement type contracts: there is little the Government can do to 
incentivize the contractor to control costs. Because the contractor is already being paid a 
fixed fee while having all of its allowable costs reimbursed~ there is little incentive for 
him to control costs. As such, the CPFF contract type should only be used when other 
contract types are not practical. However, given the uncertainties that lie in the 
developmental phases of a major defense acquisition, the use of the CPFF contract is 
usually appropriate. 
3. Use of Cost-Plus-Award-Fee Contract 
The AAA V PMO chose to use a Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract for the 
Concept Demonstration and Validation (CDN) phase of the program. A CPAF contract 
was chosen over the more common CPFF contract, or other types of cost-reimbursement 
contracts, for one reason. The CP AF contract, with its periodic award fee evaluations and 
Government determined award criteria, allows the PM to apply emphasis where he 
desires within the program. And, as the program evolves and priorities change, the PM 
can change the award fee criteria as necessary to reflect these changes in priorities and 
focus the contractor on the new priorities. 
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The drawback to the CP AF contract is it requires more Government 
administrative effort than the other types of cost-reimbursement contracts. In the case of 
the AAA V CDN phase CP AF contract, the administrative effort of managing the award 
fee process was greater than had been expected. Originally, there was no formal feedback 
to the contractor planned other than the formal award fee review process at the end of 
each award fee period. Then, after the second award fee period the process changed. At 
the conclusion of the second award fee period GDLS was awarded significantly less fee 
than they had expected. The contractor was surprised because they had expected a much 
better evaluation of their performance, based on the informal feedback they were 
receiving at the working level. The concern expressed by GDLS over this caused the 
Government to institute a monthly feedback program. These interim evaluations let 
GDLS know how they are performing relative to the award criteria instead of having to 
wait until the formal review process at the end of the award fee period. 
The researcher has concluded that the reason GDLS was surprised by the low 
amount of award fee they received at the end of the second award fee period is because of 
the informal feedback the GDLS employees received. The informal feedback resulted 
from the day-to-day contact with Government employees in the IPTs and led GDLS to 
believe they had met the Government expectations for each of the award fee criteria. 
However, this informal feedback came from the individual perspective of those 
employees at the working level and not from the Program Manager or the Award Fee 
Review Board (AFRB). As such, when all three of the second period criteria were 
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evaluated, the AFRB concluded that GDLS had not attained at least an acceptable rating 
in one of the criteria. This evaluation resulted in GDLS receiving zero award fee on a 
criterion that accounted for 40 percent of the award fee available for that period. 
The disadvantage of providing feedback on a monthly basis is that the award fee 
program is more time consuming for both GDLS and the Government than before when 
only the final evaluation was provided. Providing feedback monthly is critical, though, 
in keeping the contractor informed and appraised of the PMO's evaluation of his 
performance. Therefore, if corrective action needs to be taken to ensure that the 
contractor is meeting the Government's expectations in order to receive the award fee, he 
has time to make the appropriate changes before the evaluation period ends. 
Two important lessons have been learned during the CDN phase regarding the 
administration of the award fee. First, the PMO must establish a thorough periodic 
review process that ensures the contractor understands whether or not he is meeting the 
PM's expectations for the award fee. This is especially important in an IPT environment, 
like that used in the AAA V program, where Government and contractor employees have 
daily contact. Without clear, concise feedback from the AFRB, the contractor may rely 
on the informal feedback received at the working level and assume that they are 
performing adequately to receive the full, or a substantial portion of, the award fee. 
Second, the PMO should look at previous experiences that the contractor has had with 
CP AF contracts to determine what their expectations may be on future contracts. This 
way, the PMO can let the contractor know at the first indication that they may not be 
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receiving the award fee percentage that they have typically received on previous contracts 
or expected to receive during this award fee period. In the case of GDLS, they were used 
to receiving 90 to 95 percent of the available award fee per period on previous contracts 
with the U.S. Army. This may have led the contractor to believe that the award fee was 
"automatic" and they would receive a substantial portion of the fee regardless of the 
quality of performance. 
D. IMPACT OF UNIQUE CONTRACT CLAUSES 
The AAA V PMO has used several unique contract clauses in the Concept 
Demonstration and Validation (CDN) contract. These clauses have given the PMO 
additional tools in which to incentivize the contractor and to facilitate the development of 
the AAA V. The four unique clauses in the contract with GDLS are: (1) specified 
geographic location of the contractor's office with Government collocation, (2) contractor 
use Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) concepts and Integrated Product 
Teams (IPTs), (3) contractor cost sharing, and (4) a Special Design Decision Provision. 
The next section of this chapter examines the unique contract clauses and their impact on 
the program. 
1. Impact of Geographic Location and Collocation 
The contractor's AAA V Washington, D.C. Research and Development 
Facility shall be located within 20 minutes travel by car of Springfield, 
Virginia, the intersection of Interstate 95, 395, and 495.[Ref. 54:p. SOW-
4] 
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The facilities (offices, spaces, furniture and equipment) to be provided 
shall be equal to those provided by the Contractor for its use for personnel 
and other Government personnel assigned to support the AAA V program. 
The facilities provided shall be collocated with the contractor's AAAV 
Washington, D.C. Research and Development Facility. [Ref. 54:p. 134] 
The typical MDAP PMO is geographically separated from the contractor. Not 
only do the PMO and contractor work in separate facilities; they are usually not even 
located in the same city or state. As such, communications between the contractor 
employees and members of the PMO are limited to telephone conversations, e-mails, 
faxes and infrequent (usually quarterly) face-to-face visits. This geographic separation 
creates a communication problem as well as delays in resolving issues. Furthermore, it 
helps contribute to an "us versus them" mind set. With the requirement of collocation, 
instead of only seeing each other on an infrequent basis, the Governm,ent and contractor 
personnel see each other daily. The collocation has also facilitated the requirement for 
the contractor to implement additional initiatives, namely Integrated Product and Process 
Development (IPPD) concepts and Integrated Product Teams (lPTs), which are discussed 
later. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) 
chose an office located in Woodbridge, Virginia, approximately halfway between the 
Pentagon and Quantico, Virginia. The geographic location of the AAA V PMO has been 
beneficial in several ways. First, both the Pentagon and the Marine Corps Systems 
Command are each less than a 20-minute drive from the PMO. The close proximity to 
Washington has helped facilitate briefings to important acquisition personnel on every 
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level of staff: Secretary of Defense; Department of the Navy; and within Headquarters, 
u.S. Marine Corps. Access to Marines with amtrac experience at Quantico has helped 
the contractor get valuable input on system design decisions from potential future AAA V 
users. Second, moving to a new facility helped break both the PMO and the contractor 
away from their respective headquarters and create the "cultural change" envisioned by 
the PM. Finally, the geographic location has helped expose GDLS employees to the 
Marine Corps through the unique training and orientation program as discussed in the. 
previous chapter. Additional benefits of the collocation are explained below. 
a. Benefits of Collocation 
Probably the single biggest factor in the success of the AAAV program 
has been the collocation of contractor and Government employees in the same facility. 
Collocation has improved the communication between the contractor and the Government 
and has significantly reduced the time it takes to make program decisions. If a question 
or issue arises from either side, it can be quickly answered or resolved by just walking 
down the hall to the other party. Collocation has been essential in improving 
communications, developing a better relationship, and ultimately increasing the trust 
between the PMO and GDLS. Collocation has also been invaluable in allowing the use 
of the CP AF contract and teaming. 
Collocating at a new facility had the additional benefit of allowing GDLS 
the opportunity to "hand select" the core personnel that would be moved to work on the 
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AAA V program. This ensured that only the highest quality, most dedicated personnel 
would be working on the program. This has had a great impact in the ability of the 
contractor to implement Integrated Product and Process Development (IPPD) processes, 
since all of the employees moving to the new facility knew they would be working in a 
"teaming" environment. Had GDLS been allowed to pick the site of the facility, they 
may have chosen a location near their headquarters in Sterling Heights, Michigan. If so, 
they may have been less likely to send their best personnel to work on the project since 
they would be close or collocated with their own division headquarters. 
Since the AAA V PMO already existed in Arlington, Virginia, they all 
moved to the new facility when it became available in September 1996. At this time, the 
PCO collocated from Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) in 
Quantico while the ACO collocated from DCMC Manassas. It is the researcher's belief 
that had the Government not mandated the specific geographic location in the 
Washington, D. C. area the contractor would have remained at or near their existing 
corporate headquarters in Michigan to design the AAA V. The researcher also believes 
that the AAA V PMO would have remained in the northern Virginia area, either at its 
existing office in Arlington or at MARCORSYSCOM in Quantico, and not collocated 
with the contractor. Not collocating would have prevented the highly successful 
implementation of teaming concepts and the exposure of the contractor to its customer, 
the Marine Corps. 
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b. Disadvantages of Collocation 
Despite the fact that key contractor employees were "hand selected" to 
move to the new facility, there is a concern expressed by both GDLS and Government 
employees over relocating away from the relative security of corporate offices or a large 
Government office. This concern stems from the belief among some employees that 
moving to a smaller, isolated office away from their parent organization's key facilities 
would be harmful to their career and limit their future opportunities. Because of the 
limited number of personnel within each specialty at a small, isolated office, promotion 
opportunities would be limited. Also, fear of moving away from an office where there 
might be ten people all doing the same type of work to an office where the employee 
would be the only one performing a particular type of work caused anxiety. The counter 
to this argument from the GDLS Contracts Manager is that the skills learned working in 
the IPPD/IPT environment are making the GDLS employees very valuable within the 
company. In the future, many will be able to relocate within the company to another 
office or program and use their expertise to assist the conversion to this new way of doing 
business. 
Another risk of collocation is that the constant daily contact could cause 
an unduly familiar relationship between the contractor and PMO staffs. This could 
potentially result in inflated evaluations of the award fee criteria and lead to unearned fee 
being awarded to the contractor. There is no evidence, however, that this has occurred in 
the AAA V program. The fee evaluation process at AAA V program is conducted with the 
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same rigor expected on any program and, in fact, GDLS has received less award fee on 
the AAA V CDN contract than on other contracts, as has been previously discussed. 
2. Teaming 
The Government and the contractor agree to utilize and Integrated Product 
and Process Development (lPPD) approach including the concept of 
"TEAMING" in managing this program.[Ref. 54:p. H-24] 
Use of the Integrated Product and Process Development (lPPD) process is new 
and both AAAV PMO and GDLS personnel were unfamiliar with it at the beginning. In 
some cases the IPPD process required a "cultural change" from the way things were done 
in the past. This could have become a major stumbling block to the success of the 
program. As stated in the Department of Defense Guide to Integrated Product and 
Process Development: [Ref. 60] 
Given current approaches, cultural change is required for the IPPD process 
to work. Because of the hierarchical structure of the military services, 
adaptation to the IPPD method of doing business may be difficult due to 
the changing roles of the different staffs. This perception can become 
more pronounced as differences in rank increase. It is essential that an 
atmosphere with freedom to express ideas without repercussion from those 
conflicting views is created. Recommendation: Do not underestimate the 
forces of resistance to change. Spend what may seem like an inordinate 
effort on cultural change management. To the maximum extent possible, 
utilize a rewards system to recognize and encourage the desired change. 
Even though the IPPD process appears to be running smoothly at the AAA V 
program, the requirement in the contract that the contractor utilize IPPD practices is 
actually not recommended in the DoD Guide to IPPD. The Guide states that "A series of 
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'approved, recommended, or best practices' for applying IPPD should not be 
contractually imposed." The concern is that by directing the use of IPPD they will 
become "standards by implication and contractors will be hesitant to deviate from them 
for fear of being found non-responsive. " [Ref. 60] 
The Guide further recommends selecting a contractor that already has "established 
an IPPD culture and should not need steps for implementation dictated by DoD." This is 
a valid recommendation as long as a metric for IPPD implementation is included in the 
source selection criteria used when determining which company to award a contract. 
Gener~l Dynamics Land Systems did not have any experience with IPPD, but by 
including the requirement in the SOW the Government ensured that the contractor would 
use the IPPD process, even though they had not used it in the past. Additionally, by 
providing a specific definition of what was expected in the contract, the Government 
ensured that the IPPD process being utilized was the version the Government desired, not 
just the contractor's version ofIPPD. 
Utilizing the IPPD approach can result in significant benefits to both the 
contractor and the Government. By integrating all facets of the program from the very 
beginning, the program manager and contractor should be able to avoid costly mistakes 
by identifying potential problem areas early in the program. Additionally, overall costs 
and the time required for the program are reduced while still maintaining a high quality 
product'that meets the SOW. This is different from the traditional approach where the 
contractor and program office are organized on functional lines. The main problem with 
81 
the traditional organization of a program management office is that without the 
integration of the many functional areas, problems are overlooked or not identified until 
late in the development of the program when the cost of changes are high. The end result 
of not working together is overall higher program costs and delays. By using an IPPD 
process, the bulk of changes occur early in development, when change costs are low, 
resulting in lower program costs. 
The two most important characteristics of IPTs are cooperation and 
empowerment.[Ref. 61] Cooperation is essential for teams to be successful. Team 
members must have an equal voice in the decision making process. Each member, with 
their own unique area of expertise, needs to be recognized by the other IPT members but 
this does not mean that their particular view is the "right" one. There can be 
disagreement on how to approach a particular issue, but that disagreement must be 
reasoned disagreement based on an alternative plan of action rather than unyielding 
opposition. [Ref. 61] Issues that cannot be resolved within the IPT need to be elevated as 
quickly as possible to the next level IPT for early resolution. The researcher found no 
evidence that there were problems in resolving disagreements or conflicts within IPTs at 
the AAA V program. 
One important fact is that Government IPT members do not lead the IPT or make 
the decisions. The IPTs belong to GDLS and the Government members are there to 
assist in the process, not control it. Current guidance provided to Government members 
of AAA V IPTs is that they do not approve or disapprove of IPT decisions, plans or 
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reports. They are members of the IPT to offer their opinion in the development of IPT 
decisions, plans or reports, and to vote as a member of the IPT.[Ref. 35] Government 
members are expected to coordinate with their supervisor to ensure that they are passing 
the "Government" opinion to the IPT. Additionally, Government members of IPTs do 
not have veto power over decisions made by the IPT.[Ref. 35] 
The "D" level IPTs, as described in the previous chapter, are "product IPTs" and 
have the most impact on the program. It is at the "D" level where the individual 
components and systems of the AAA V are designed. The "D" level IPTs have been 
assigned their share of the cost and weight as well as being responsible for the 
performance of their "product". As a result, while engineers in other programs would be 
concerned about little else than the performance characteristics of the component or 
system they were designing, engineers on the AAA V program are now integrated into a 
team where they have to also be concerned about issues such as cost.[Ref. 53] 
a. Training Integrated Product Teams 
Integrated Product Team training was not conducted before the IPTs began 
meeting. This resulted in poorly organized IPT meetings that were ineffective and 
inefficiently used IPT member's time. The contractor and the AAA V PMO quickly 
learned that the IPT process required training and skills, such as how to conduct an 
effective meeting, which many acquisition personnel did not already possess. 
Consequently, a training program was established that all GDLS and Government 
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The intent of the training was to teach the employees how to work in an IPT environment 
and to establish an IPT baseline for all personnel, both contractor and Government, from 
which to build. 
Traditional, classroom type training was conducted first to give the AAA V 
IPT members a foundation of skills necessary to succeed in the IPPD environment. The 
contractor used a consulting firm to conduct training for all IPT members, both contractor 
and Government, on topics such as "How to run an effective meeting". [Ref. 53] 
Additionally, the Government hired a consultant to teach Stephen Covey's "Seven Habits 
of Highly Effective People" and Marine Corps officers provided leadership training to all 
IPT members.[Ref. 53] This training helped establish the common baseline necessary to 
make the IPTs successful. 
h. Concerns for Teaming 
There are a number of potential drawbacks to the use of IPTs. One issue 
with the use of IPTs is what to do if there is an "adversarial" representative on the team 
that is causing problems whenever possible. This type of behavior would most likely be 
expected when the member in question had not undergone the "cultural change' 
previously mentioned and was unwilling to go along with the new process. The first 
course of action is to try to deal with the problem within the IPT. If the IPT cannot 
resolve the problem, then it immediately is raised to the next level of decision making. 
[Ref. 62] 
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A second drawback to IPTs is that participation in them takes time. 
Personnel that are members of several different IPTs could potentially be involved in IPT 
meetings every day. Each of the IPTs within the AAAV program meets at least once per 
week. [Ref. 53] Since most Government and contractor personnel are on two or more 
different IPTs, this may mean that they are in meetings three to five hours per day. 
GDLS schedules IPT meetings every day of the week except Fridays. [Ref. 63] The 
amount of time spent in meetings raises the concern over the size of the staff required to 
sit on all of these IPTs. Some program managers may feel that they will have to increase 
the size of their staff to support IPTs. This is especially difficult in a time of diminishing 
personnel resources. So, when IPT meetings are convened, they must be formally 
structured and well-planned to avoid non-productive time. This may not happen without 
the proper training and guidance. Additionally, a mechanism such as a computer 
database should be available that stores IPT meeting minutes and is available to those 
members that are not able to attend a meeting. The database should also contain the 
proposed agenda for upcoming meetings so IPT members can be prepared for the meeting 
before it begins. The AAA V PMO has such a database, called the Virtual Design 
Database, and it is used to store IPT information as well as numerous other documents. 
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3. Contractor Cost Sharing 
The Contractor shall absorb 100% of its costs incurred ... from the point 
where its total costs incurred equals $205,007,988 until its total costs 
incurred shall equal $214,826,694, and the Government shall have no 
obligation to reimburse the Contractor for any such costs ... [Ref. 54:p. B-
3] 
In the event the total estimated costs incurred ... should exceed 
$214,826,694 and the Contracting Officer elects to proceed with contract 
performance, the Government shall ... reimburse the Contractor for 100% 
of its allowable, allocable and reasonable costs incurred ... in excess of 
$214,826,694.[Ref. 54:p. B-3] 
General Dynamics offered a cost-sharing arrangement as part of its proposal for 
the CDN contract. The cost-sharing provision is shown in Appendix F. The cost-
sharing arrangement was used by GDLS as one way to make their proposal more 
competitive. There are two benefits to this provision in the contract. First, this provision 
allows the Government to save approximately $10 million of the estimated cost during 
the CDN phase. Second, the cost-sharing proposal has the potential to be effective in 
incentivizing GDLS to control costs and keep them under the amount where cost-sharing 
begins, since they will not be getting reimbursed for up to $10 million of their estimated 
costs, if costs incurred exceed $205 million. 
The researcher has concluded that GDLS offered the cost-sharing arrangement as 
a competitive tool to help them receive the contract. The contractor may have also 
thought they would be able to achieve some sort of efficiency during the performance of 
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the contract that would allow them to keep costs under the amount where they begin 
absorbing all costs. 
The researcher believes that the cost-sharing clause will be effective in saving the 
Government approximately $10 million in one of three ways. First, if the cost-sharing 
provision successfully incentivizes the contractor to stay under the $205 million cost 
amount where they begin absorbing all costs, then the provision was effective in reducing 
the contract costs to less than had been expected. Second, even if the contractor reaches 
the point where they begin absorbing costs, but stay under the $214.8 million cost 
amount, then the provision was again successful in saving the Government the amount of 
cost that the contractor absorbed. Finally, even if the contractor exceeds the cost-sharing 
amount and the Government again begins reimbursing the contractor for its allowable 
costs, the Government will still have saved approximately $10 million that it would have 
reimbursed the contractor without this clause. If this clause is determined to have been 
effective once the contract is completed, the Government should consider using it in other 
contracts as a way to incentivize the contractor to reduce costs. 
It is the conclusion of the researcher that the contractor has no incentive to exceed 
the estimated cost of the contract since doing so would affect his cost performance in the 
Earned Value Management System and could potentially jeopardize the entire program. 
Even if the contractor tried to overrun·the estimated cost in an attempt to recover his costs 
by "making work", he would still be out the $10 million in costs he incurred (and 
submitted vouchers for) during the cost-sharing period. Because of the close working 
87 
relationship and insight resulting from the collocation and IPT environment, it would be 
difficult for the contractor to submit erroneous vouchers in an attempt to make up for the 
costs it absorbed. 
The researcher believes a cost overrun could potentially jeopardize the program in 
several ways. First, if the overrun was excessive, the AAA V program could be cancelled. 
Second, if the overrun exceeded the funds that were available to the AAA V PMO to pay 
for the CDIV contract, then they would have to ask for additional funding, which would 
bring unwanted attention to the program. Finally, if funding was not available, then the 
AAA V PMO would have to delay work that could potentially delay the Initial 
Operational Capability (IOC) date of the AAAV. 
4. System Design Decision Provision 
... situations may occur in which ... trade-off analyses clearly indicate the 
desirability of design decisions which would significantly increase the 
Contractor's costs of performance during the DemonstrationlValidation 
(DemNal) Phase because of substantially greater long-term benefits to the 
AAA V Program resulting from anticipated savings in subsequent Program 
Phases and/or lower life cycle costs throughout the service life of the 
AAAV.[Ref. 54:p. H-31] 
... if the Government determines that the overall, long-term benefits to the 
Marine Corps substantially outweigh the additional costs to be incurred by 
the Contractor during the DemN al Phase, the Contract will be equitably 
adjusted to reflect the Contractor's anticipated increase in DemIV al costs 
(including FCCM and fee) resulting from the design decision.[Ref. 54:p. 
H-32] 
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The final unique contract provision examined is the System Design Decision 
Provision shown in Appendix G. This provision was developed by the AAAV PMO as a 
means to incentivize GDLS to make effective, realistic trade studies. The clause 
incentivizes the contractor to make design changes because in addition to being 
reimbursed for increased costs to the instant contract, the contract will also be adjusted to 
reflect increased Facilities Capital Cost of Money (FCCM) and fee. Without this clause, 
the contractor would only have its allowable costs reimbursed for design changes that 
result in additional cost to the Government on the instant contract but would not receive 
any FCCM or fee based on the increased cost. Additionally, without this provision, the 
contractor would be penalized in the cost portion of the Earned Value Management 
System since the additional cost would be treated as a cost overrun. 
Here is an example of how the Special Design Decision Provision works. If the 
contractor determines during a trade study of transmissions that designing the AAA V to 
support transmission X costs $2 million more than designing it to support transmission Y, 
and transmission Y offers similar performance to transmission X but saves the 
. Government $25 million in life-cycle costs, this special provision would allow GDLS to 
be reimbursed for their allowable costs and still receive additional FCCM and fee. 
The System Design Decision Provision is similar in some ways to a Value 
Engineering Change Proposal (VECP). Both clauses are based on the contractor 
proposing a change in the contract that will result in a cost saving to the Government. A 
significant difference between them, however, is that with the System Design Decision 
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Provision, the instant contract will cost more and the cost savings to the Government will 
result in the future as explained in the preceding section. With the VECP, the savings to 
the Government occur on the instant contract as well as similar concurrent and future 
contracts. An additional difference is that VECP clauses are used in production contracts 
and are not suitable for a development effort. 
The researcher believes that the System Design Decision Provision has been 
effective in incentivizing the contractor to conduct effective trade studies. This 
conclusion is based on two trade studies which have been conducted that have resulted in 
$2,256,265 in additional cost to the Government but will result in anticipated production 
cost savings of $38,797,900 and operation and support cost savings of $205,000,000 over 
the expected life of the AAA V. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed the contracting decisions that were made during the course 
of the Technology Base Development program, the Concept Exploration phase and the 
early stages of the Concept Demonstration and Validation phase of the AAA V program. 
The researcher determined that appropriate contracting decisions had been made and that 
the unique contract clauses used in the CDN contract were valuable in incentivizing the 
contractor. The geographic location required by the contract, coupled with the 
collocation of the contractor and the AAA V PMO, have also had significant positive 
benefits. 
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The next chapter presents the researcher's conclusions, recommendations and 
answers the primary and subsidiary research questions. 
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v. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The focus of this research effort was to examine the contracting decisions that 
have been made during the early phases of the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
(AAA V) program. The history of the AAA V program was presented along with the 
contracting organizations, the contract types, and special contract clauses used. This 
chapter will draw conclusions from the research effort and subsequent analysis that has 
been presented. Recommendations will then be made as to how the successful lessons 
learned from the AAAV program may be applied to other acquisition programs. Finally, 
areas for further research will be presented. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Collocation of the AAA V Program Management Office (PMO); the contractor. 
General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS); and the Defense Contract Management 
Command (DCMC) Program Support Team (PST) has provided tremendous benefits to 
the overall program. 
Collocation of the contractor, the PST and the AAA V PMO has been the 
important factor in the success of the AAA V program. The daily interaction between 
Governrilent and contractor employees has helped create trust and build a bond between 
the two parties, minimizing the traditional "us versus them" mentality that exists in many 
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programs. At the AAA V program, communications are not limited to telephone calls and 
occasional face-to-face meetings. Instead, collocation has allowed constant daily 
interaction that has improved the communications process tremendously. Finally, 
collocation has allowed the highly successful implementation of the Integrated Product 
and Process Development (IPPD) process and Integrated Product Teams (IPTs). 
2. The use of Integrated Product and Process Development (lPPD) concept with 
Integrated Product Teams OPTs) has significantly improved the relationship between the 
Government and the contractor while reducing the cycle-time required to implement 
changes. 
The AAA V PMO mandated the use of IPPD and IPTs in the Concept 
Demonstration and Validation (CDN) contract. The IPPD process has resulted in 
problems being identified and resolved quickly. More importantly, ~y using IPTs, the 
problems are being resolved early on in the program when it is both cheaper and quicker 
to implement the solutions. Since the IPTs are comprised of both contractor and 
Government members, a close relationship has developed between the members as the 
IPTs work together as a team to solve problems. 
3. The use of the Special Design Decision Provision has been effective in 
incentivizing the contractor to conduct realistic trade studies that have resulted in 
significant life-cycle cost (LCC) savings for the AAA V program. 
The Special Design Decision Provision was added to the CDN contract in order 
to incentivize the contractor to conduct realistic trade studies. Without ihis special 
provision, any design changes made by the contractor that resulted in greater cost to the 
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Government would be treated as a cost overrun and not subject to additional base and 
award fee (profit) for the contractor. This provision allows the contractor to have his 
costs reimbursed for a design change as well as receive additional profit. 
4. The geographic location of the contractor's facility as mandated in the contract 
has been beneficial in facilitating a "cultural change" necessary to implement IPPD and 
exposing the contractor to the Marine Corns. 
The geographic location required by the contract forced the contractor winning 
the CDN contract to move away from its corporate headquarters to a new facility in the 
Washington, D.C. area. This allowed the contractor to carefully select the employees 
that would be moving to the new facility to work on the AAA V program. The contractor 
could select those employees that were agreeable to working in a teaming and IPPD 
environment, thereby ensuring that this new way of doing business would not be met 
with resistance. Additionally, by moving away from the corporate headquarters, the 
contractor's AAA V team was unencumbered by constant corporate oversight and allowed 
to try innovative processes and management techniques. Finally, the close proximity to 
Marine Corps units in Quantico, Virginia, has facilitated exposure of contractor 
employees to the Marine Corps. This has allowed contractor employees to gain a better 
understanding of their "customer." 
5. The Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract type used by the AAAV PMO 
during the Concept Demonstration and Validation (CDN) phase has been effective in 
incentivizing the contractor. 
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The CP AF contract used in the CDN phase of the AAA V program is divided into 
ten award fee periods. Each period has different award fee criteria that the AAA V PMO 
uses to evaluate the contractor to determine to what extent the contractor is meeting the 
Government requirements. If the contractor is not meeting Government designated 
award fee criteria, then they will not get the full amount of award fee available to them. 
This contract type appears to provide the Program Manager a great deal of leverage over 
the contractor in ensuring that the Government expectations are met on the contract. 
6. There are challenges with IPTs that must be identified and resolved prior to 
using IPTs. 
Integrated Product Teams are an excellent way to create a team environment 
necessary for innovative change to occur in a program. However, training must be 
conducted prior to using IPTs so that all team members have a common baseline of 
knowledge about teaming before beginning the process. The training should include 
techniques for conducting effective meetings and time-management. The meetings 
associated with IPTs take a significant investment of time and the PMO must be prepared 
for this. Finally, not everyone has the requisite skills to be an effective IPT leader and 
plans must be made to identify potential personnel problems that may arise during the 
conduct of the IPT sessions. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DOD 
1·. Program offices should be collocated with their prime contractors, where 
practicable. 
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Collocation has been one of the most important factors in the success of the 
AAA V program. Collocation has improved communications between the Government 
and the contractor and facilitated the implementation of innovative processes like IPPD 
and the use of IPTs. 
2. Program offices should use the IPPD concept and IPTs. where practicable. 
The benefits to be gained through early identification and resolution of potential 
problems by using IPPD concepts and IPTs are significant. Every effort must be made to 
overcome "cultural biases" or any other resistance to move away from the traditional 
approach to program management. Additionally, quality training must be provided to 
IPT members so they can learn the skills necessary to be successful in the IPPD 
environment. 
3. The Special Design Decision Provision used in the AAA V program CDN 
contract should be adopted for use during the design stages of other acquisition programs. 
The Special Design Decision Provision used the AAA V program has been very 
beneficial as a means to reduce production and life-cycle costs. This provision has 
provided an incentive to the contractor to conduct realistic trade studi~s that while costing 
the Government more during the design phase of the program should result in significant 
production and life-cycle cost savings. 
4. Program Management Offices should take steps to expose contractors to the 
customer so the contractor has a better appreciation of the customer and their needs. 
The AAA V program implemented the successful program explained in Chapter 
III to expose the contractor to the Marine Corps. This exposure to the Marine Corps has 
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helped give the contractor a better appreciation of their customer, helped foster a stronger 
working relationship, and is helping to design a better vehicle. 
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This section answers the study's primary and subsidiary research questions based 
on the background and analysis provided in the previous chapters. Since the subsidiary 
questions support the primary question, they will be answered first. 
Subsidiary Question # 1. What was the Advanced Assault Amphibian (AAA) 
concept and how did it lead to the establishment of the AAA V program? 
The AAA concept evolved from the requirement to land Marines ashore from 
ships stationed over-the-horizon. The AAA concept included any means possible to 
accomplish the ship-to-shore movement, not necessarily by an amphibious vehicle. In 
order to determine which method was most effective, the Marine Corps examined 13 
different alternatives that included high-water speed amphibious vehicles, low-water 
speed amphibious vehicles, non-amphibious vehicles, and non-vehicles. A Cost and 
Operational Effectiveness Analysis concluded that a high-water speed amphibious 
vehicle, the AAA V, was the most effective alternative. 
Subsidiary Question #2. What was the initial acquisition strategy of the AAA V 
program and how has it evolved? 
The initial acquisition strategy in 1988 was to procure 1400 AAAVs with an 
Initial Operational Capability of 4th quarter, Fiscal Year 1999 (FY -99). The plan was to 
use mUltiple contractors and cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contracts for both the Concept 
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Exploration (CE) and Concept Demonstration and Validation (CDN) phases of the 
program. Because the technological risk of the vehicle was studied extensively and due 
to funding. issues, the program was delayed. However, three sets of risk reduction 
contracts were awarded during the CE phase of the program that reduced the risk 
adequately enough that the AAA V PMO was able to down-select to only one contractor 
during the CDN phase. By down-selecting to only one contractor, instead of using two 
or more contractors as had been originally planned, the AAA V PMO was able to 
implement collocation and more effectively use the IPPD concept and IPTs. The current 
acquisition strategy is to produce 1013 AAAVs with an IOC of 3rd quarter FY-06. 
Subsidiary Question #3. What was the organizational structure used to effectively 
execute the acquisition strategy of the AAA V program? 
The organizational structure of the AAA V program evolved into a unique 
Program Management Office. The AAA V PMO is collocated with contractor and also 
includes the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) and Administrative Contracting 
Officer (ACO). Additionally, the PMO contains a separate Contract Management section 
that also assists in the contracting effort. The PMO and contractor are organized into 28 
Integrated Product Teams (lPTs) that work together very effectively in designing the 
AAA V and executing the acquisition strategy. 
Subsidiary Question #4. What have been the contracting vehicles used during the 
AAA V program and how effective have they been? 
The AAAV PMO has effectively used both cost-reimbursement and fixed-price 
type contracts. The most frequently used contract type has been the Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee 
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(CPFF) contract, which is typical in the developmental phases of a program. Firm-Fixed-
Price (FFP) contracts were used successfully on five occasions when the requirements of 
the contract were well-defined and the risk to the contractor was low. The Cost-Plus-
Award-Fee (CPAF) contract being used in the CDN phase has been very effective in 
incentivizing the contractor to focus his efforts on meeting the specific criteria defined in 
the award fee plan. 
Subsidiary Question #5. To what extent has the AAAV program used special 
contract clauses? 
The AAA V program has successfully used several special contract clauses. In the 
CDN contract, the AAA V program mandated the geographic location of the contractor's 
facility, collocation of the AAAV PMO with the contractor, and the use of an IPPD 
concept with IPTs. The CDN contract also contains a Special Design Decision 
Provision that helps incentivize the contractor to make realistic trade studies that hold the 
potential to significantly reduce production and life-cycle costs of the AAA V. 
Subsidiary Question #6. What impact has IPT/IPPD had on the contracting effort 
within the AAA V program? 
The use of the IPPD concept and IPTs has been very successful in keeping the 
contracting personnel informed and involved in the program. Within the IPT framework, 
the contracting personnel and the contractor work together in developing solutions to 
issues that arise, such as design changes that result in contract modifications. By 
involving the contractor throughout the decision making process, cycle time has been 
significantly reduced. 
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Subsidiary Question #7. How might an analysis of the contracting decisions 
made in the early phases of the AAA V program be used in the successful execution of 
other defense acquisition programs? 
The contracting decisions made in the AAA V program will be beneficial to other 
defense acquisition programs because they show the successful implementation of the 
IPPD concept, IPTs, a unique PMO organization and use of special contract clauses. 
Additionally, other defense acquisition programs can look at the unique provisions of the 
CDN contract, like collocation and the Special Design Decision Provision, for ideas on 
ways to improve their program and provide additional means to incentivize their 
contractors. 
Primary Research Question: What have been the critical contracting decisions 
and events regarding the AAA V Program and how have these affected the nature and 
scope of the AAA V Program as it exists today and how will an analysis of these critical 
decisions and events affect the future development. production. and deployment of the 
AAAV? 
During the Concept Exploration phase of the AAA V program three sets of risk 
reducing contracts were awarded. Also during this timeframe, the Technology Base 
Development Program was gaining critical knowledge that would be used in developing 
key systems in the future AAA V. These activities successfully reduced the risk enough 
that the AAA V program was able to down-select to one contractor during the CDN 
phase of the program. By only using one contractor during the CDN phase, the AAA V 
program was able to mandate that the contractor locate its design facility in the 
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Washington, D.C. area, that the PMO collocate with the contractor and that the contractor 
use the IPPD concept and IPTs. 
These critical decisions have helped create a "cultural change" and an 
environment within the PMO and contractor that has been receptive to new, innovative 
ideas. This environment and the use of the IPPD concept and IPTs has allowed the 
contractor to identify problems early on in the program where they take less time and are 
much cheaper to correct. This environment has also helped reduce cycle time, thereby 
ensuring that the AAA V program remains on schedule, despite changes that have 
occurred in the program. The use of the Special Design Decision Provision has 
incentivized the contractor to make realistic trade studies that have resulted in significant 
production and life.;cycle cost savings. These decisions will help ensure that the AAA V 
remains within budget and is delivered on time. 
E. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
During this research effort several other areas were discovered that warrant 
further study. First, the AAAV PMO is unique in that its contracting organization 
includes the pca, ACO and a Contract Manager. An analysis into this organizational 
structure would be beneficial in determining if the role of the Contract Manager would be 
beneficial in other Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). Second, the Systems 
Design Decision Provision of the CDN contract is unique to the AAA V program. A 
detailed analysis into its benefits would be useful in determining to what extent this 
clause, or one like it, could be used during other phases of MDAPs. Finally, the 
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collocation of the AAA V PMO with the contractor in a new facility geographically 
separated from the contractor's corporate headquarters has been beneficial in creating a 
"cultural change" within the program. A study that examines how receptive major 
defense contractors would be in entering into similar arrangements in the future with 
























APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Acquisition Category 1 D 
Administrative Contracting Officer 
Air Cushion Vehicle 
Acquisition Decision Memorandum 
Award Fee Review Board 
Amphibian Tractor 
Automotive Test Rig 
Assault Amphibian Vehicle 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development 
and Acquisition 
Amphibious Warfare Strategy 
Amphibious Warfare Surface Assault 
Amphibious Warfare Technology 
Best And Final Offer 
Business and Financial Manager 
Cost As an Independent Variable 
Concept Demonstration and Validation 
Concept Exploration 
Commanding General, Marine Corps Development and 
Education Center 
CO, MCRDAC Commanding General, Marine Corps Research, 
Development and Acquisition Command 
CLIN Contract Line Item Number 
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps 
CNO Chief of Naval Operations 
COEA Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis 
COMMMARCORSYSCOM Commander, Marine Corps Systems Command 




DAB Defense Acquisition Board 
DA WIA Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
DoD Department of Defense 
DoN Department of the Navy 
DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency 
DCMC Defense Contract Management Command 
DRPM Direct Reporting Program Manager 














































David Taylor Research Center 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Facilities Capital Cost of Money 
Fee Determination Official 
Firm-Fixed-Price 
Federally Funded Research and Development Center 
Food Machinery Corporation 
Fiscal Year 
General Dynamic Land Systems 
Head Contracting Agency 
Hydrodynamic Suspension Unit 
High-Water Speed Technology Demonstrator 
Independent Cost Estimate 
Infantry Fighting Vehicle 
Initial Operating Capability 
Integrated Product and Process Development 
Integrated Product Team 
Justification and Approval 
Light Armored Vehicle 
Landing Craft, Air Cushioned 
Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel 
Landing Ship Fast 
Landing Vehicle, Assault 
Landing Vehicle, Tracked 
Landing Vehicle, Tracked Model 1 
Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Experimental) 
Mission Area Analysis 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force 
Marine Corps Systems Command 
Marine Corps Development and Education Center 
Marine Corps Program Decision Meeting 
Marine Corps Research, Development and Acquisition 
Command 
Major Defense Acquisition Program 
Mission Element Need Statement 
Mission Needs Statement 
Memorandum Of Agreement 
Milestone 
Major Systems Acquisition Review Committee 
Naval Acquisition Executive 
Naval Sea Systems Command 
Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
































Office of Advanced Technology 
Operational Maneuver From The Sea 
Office of Naval Research 
Operational Requirements Document 
Over-The-Horizon 
Procuring Contracting Officer 
Program Decision Authority 
Program Decision Memorandum 
Program Definition and Risk Reduction 
Program Executive Officer 
Program Integrator 
Product Improvement Program 
Program Life-Cycle Cost Estimate 
Program Manager 
Project Manager, Assault Amphibian Vehicles 
Program Management Office 
Program Objective Memorandum 
Propulsion System Demonstrator 
Program Support Team 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
Request For Proposal 
Required Operational Capability 
Secretary of the Navy 
Surface Effects Ship Support Office 
Stratified Charge Rotary Engine 
Service Life Extension Program 
Source Selection Advisory Council 
Ship To Objective Maneuver 
United Defense Limited Partnership 
Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition 
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Director of Business 
& Finance 
Contract Manager Operations Officer 
Program Management Team 
Source: AAA Brief31 'Dec 96 to ACMC 
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APPENDIX C: DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE CONTRACT 
MANAGER 
1. C/SCSC - CPR analysis (cost, schedule, control, baseline reviews) 
2. Acquisition Plan Sponsor 
3. CDRL Sponsor (administration/tracking) 
4. Government Furnished Equipment (Administrative tracking with Logistics) 
5. Procurement Documents Assistance (PCOIACOlLegal Issues) 
- MRs/PRs 
- CDRLs 
- Statement of Work 
- Source Selection Plans 
- Monitors flow of Procurement documents 
- Maintains DRPM Contract Documents 
6. Manage Support Contract 
7. Life Cycle Cost Estimate Sponsor 
8. Cost Analysis 
9. Contract Closeout 
10. Business Contracting Officer's Representative on Concept Demonstration Validation 
Contract - funds tracking, availability, F ARs, etc. 
11. Award Fee Administration 
12. DCMA interface 
13. Part-time IPT leader and full-time member on the Program Management Team 
14. Supervisor 
15. Responsible for budget planning, reporting, and execution of all internal funds to 
support assigned tasks. 
















































APPENDIX E: GOVERNMENT IPT PARTICIPATION 
1) The IPTs are GDAS run entities. We do not lead or manage the IPTS. 
2) We serve as "customer" representatives on the IPTS. We are there to REDUCE THE 
CYCLE TIME of contractor-Government (customer) communication. In other words, we 
facilitate GDAS personnel getting Government input faster. Government IPT members 
also enable us to provide GDAS IPT Status and issue information up the government 
chain on a daily basis (instead of monthly or quarterly). 
3) WE DO NOT DO GDAS's IPT WORK, or any portion of their work or tasks. 
GDAS has been contracted to perform the tasks outlined in the contract SOW; their 
personnel and their subcontractors' personnel will perform those tasks, not us. 
4) When asked by GDAS personnel for the Government's position or interpretation, 
Government IPT members can offer their personal opinion, as an IPT member, or offer 
expert opinion; you can provide guidance as to our "customer" opinion and what might 
be acceptable to the Government but you can only offer the "Government" position for 
items that have been agreed to by you and your Supervisor. IT IS UP TO YOUR 
SUPERVISORS TO EMPOWER EACH OF YOU TO AN APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF 
AUTHORITY. It is expected that this will start at a minimal level of authority and be 
expanded as each individual's IPT experience and program knowledge grows. However; 
(see items 5 & 6) 
5) Government IPT members CAN NOT authorize any changes or deviations to/from the 
contract SOW or Specifications. If/When an IPT concludes that the best course of action 
is not in accordance with the contract, and a contract change is in order, then GDAS must 
submit a Contract Change Request (CCR) through normal channels. (See Contract Clause 
H.8, page H-l 5 of the contract). 
6) Government IPT members CAN NOT authorize GDAS to perform work that is in 
addition to the SOW/contract requirements. GDAS IPTs can perform work that is not 
specifically required by the contract, at their discretion (provided they have time and 
budget, in theory). 
7) Government IPT member participation in GDAS IPT activities IS NOT Government 
consent that the work is approved by the Government or is chargeable to the contract. If 
an [PT is doing something questionable, identify it to your supervisorlPMT member. 
8) Government members of IPTs do not approve or disapprove of IPT decisions, plans, 
or reports. You offer your opinion in their development, you vote as a member, and you 
coordinate issues with your Supervisor and bring the "Government" opinion (in the form 
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of your opinion) back to the IPT, with the goal of improving the quality of the products; 
you don't have veto power. 
9) You each are Government employees First (representatives of the Taxpayers, the 
Department of Navy, the United States Marine Corps, and the Program Manager), and 
IPT members second. We each are still subject to all the Government laws and 
regulations regarding "directed changes", ethics, and conduct. 
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APPENDIX F: SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENT REGARDING COST 
SHARING 
In accordance with the Contractor's Cost Proposal dated 28 February 1996, as 
amended by the Contractor's Best and Final Offer dated 01 June 1996, it is understood 
and agreed that the parties will share the allowable, allocable and reasonable costs 
incurred in the performance ofCLINs 0001-0002 in the following manner. 
a) In accordance with the provisions of the clause of this contract entitled 
"ALLOWABLE COST AND PAYMENT (JuI1991)," FAR 52.216-7, the Government 
shall reimburse the Contractor for 1 00% of the allowable, allocable and reasonable costs 
incurred by the Contractor in performance of its obligations under CLINs 0001-0002 of 
the contract until such time as the total of such costs incurred equals $205,007,988. It is 
further understood and agreed that the Contractor shall be entitled to receive Base Fee 
and FCCM with respect to any incurred costs up to $205,007,988. 
b) The Contractor shall absorb 100% of its costs incurred under CLINs 0001-0002 
from the point where its total costs iIicurred equals $205,007,988 until its total costs 
incurred shall equal $214,826,694, and the Government shall have no obligation to 
reimburse the Contractor for any such costs, notwithstanding the claus~ entitled 
"ALLOWABLE COST AND PAYMENT," or any other provision of this contract to the 
contrary. It is further understood and agreed that the Contractor shall not be entitled to 
receive Base Fee or FCCM with respect to any incurred costs which it absorbs pursuant 
to this agreement. 
c) In the event the total estimated costs incurred under CLINs 0001-0002 should 
exceed $214,826,694 and the Contracting Officer elects to proceed with contract 
performance, the Government shall, subject to the provisions of the clause entitled 
"ALLOWABLE COST AND PAYMENT," reimburse the Contractor for 100% of its 
allowable, allocable and reasonable costs incurred under CLINs 0001-0002 in excess of 
$214,826,694. 
d) During the period when the Contractor will absorb 100% of its incurred costs 
in accordance with paragraph b), above, the Contractor shall continue to submit invoices 
in compliance with Section G .1. of the Contract. Each invoice shall be decremented to 
indicate the Contractor's cost share for the period covered by the invoice and the net 
costs, if any, owed by the Government. Each invoice shall also indicate the cumulative 
total of costs absorbed by the Contractor to date pursuant to this agreement. 
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e) This agreement shall be modified, as necessary, to adjust the points at which 
the Contractor's cost sharing obligations shall commence and terminate, as a result of any 
changes to the total estimated amount for CLINs 0001-0002 which may be effected 
during contract performance. 
Source: AAA V CDN Contract 
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APPENDIX G: SPECIAL PROVISION REGARDING AAA V SYSTEM DESIGN 
DECISIONS 
a) It is mutually understood and agreed that critical decisions made by the Contractor in 
designing the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) System will be based 
upon the results of whole system core capabilities cost/performance trade-off analyses, as 
well as subsystem and component cost/performance trade-off analyses, which will 
consider overall AAA V Program objectives such as vehicle weight, combat effectiveness, 
design-to-unit production cost (DTUPC) and total life cycle cost (LCC) for the AAA V 
System. 
b) It is further recognized that situations may occur in which such trade-off analyses 
clearly indicate the desirability of design decisions which would significantly increase the 
Contractor's costs of performance during the Demonstration! Validation (DemNal) 
Phase because of substantially greater long-term benefits to the AAA V Program resulting 
from 'anticipated savings in subsequent Program Phases and/or lower life cycle costs 
throughout the service life of the AAA V. 
c) In recognition of the above, the parties mutually agree that whenever the Contractor 
shall consider making a design decision which the Contractor reasonably expects to 
significantly increase its costs of certain DemNal Phase effort (approximately $500,000 
or greater) over the estimated costs included by the Contractor for such effort in its Best 
and Final Offer for the DemN al Phase Contract, the Contractor may submit to the 
Contracting Officer: 
1) the Contractor's estimated DemNal costs to implement the contemplated 
design decision, with supporting documentation; 
2) the Contractor's estimate of DemNal costs for other acceptable design 
alternatives; 
3) the detailed basis for the Contractor's estimate for the effort contained in its 
DemN al Cost Proposal; 
4) the Contractor's assessment of the anticipated long-term benefits to the AAAV 
Program associated with the design decision; and 
5) any additional supporting documentation requested by the Contracting Officer. 
d) Upon consideration of the above information, if the Government determines that the 
overall, long-term benefits to the Marine Corps substantially outweigh the additional 
costs to be incurred by the Contractor during the DemN al Phase, the Contract will be 
equitably adjusted to reflect the Contractor's anticipated increase in DemNal costs 
(including FCCM and fee) resulting from said design decision. 
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e) It is understood and agreed that, except with respect to design decisions implemented 
prior to the effective date of the modification incorporating this clause into the Contract, 
no request for equitable adjustment hereunder will be considered unless the Contractor's 
request was received and fully considered by the Government prior to effecting the 
. design decision. It is further understood and agreed that, with regard to any design 
decision for which an equitable adjustment is made pursuant to this clause, the Contractor 
shall not be entitled to submit any subsequent change proposals pursuant to the clause of 
this contract entitled" VALUE ENGINEERING (MAR 1989)," FAR 52.248-1. 
f) The Contractor further agrees that decisions regarding equitable adjustments to the 
contract under this clause are within the sole discretion of the Government. Accordingly, 
any decision(s) by the Government that the Contractor shall not be entitled to an 
equitable adjustment hereunder with regard to any contemplated design decision(s) shall 
not be subject to the provisions of the clause of this Contract entitled" DISPUTES -
ALTERNATE I (DEC 1991)," FAR 52.233-1, and the Contractor hereby releases the 
Government from all liability and forever waives any actual or potential entitlement to 
any equitable adjustment in the price (cost and fee) and/or delivery schedule of this 
Contract as a result of any such decision(s). 
Source: AAA V CDN Contract 
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